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Article 6

COMMENT
Violence on Television: An Old Problem with a New Picture
Television, although a relatively new medium, has become an integral part of American life. By 1977, 72.9 million homes possessed at2
least one set.' These sets operate on the average over six hours per day
and are generally controlled by children through the early evening
hours? By the time most children graduate from high school, they will
have spent more time in watching television than in any other activity
except sleep.' In this time, it has been estimated that a child will have
witnessed 18,000 murders and countless incidents of mayhem and
crime. 5 Many argue that, as a result of this exposure to violence, minors are more likely to commit acts of violence, often in imitation of
those they have seen on television, and that they become desensitized to
violence.6 Controversy over this possible impact and over whether tele1. 1978 BROADCASTING YEARBOOK B-176. This encompasses 98% of all homes in the
United States, excluding Alaska and Hawaii. SURGEON GENERAL'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, TELEVISION AND GROWING UP: THE IMPACT OF TELEVISED
VIOLENCE 2 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT].

2. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. See also Murray, Television and Violence: Implications of the Surgeon General's Research Programme, in CHILDREN AND TELEVISION
285 (R. Brown ed. 1976); Holland, Television and Crime-a Causal Link?, 1975 AUCKLAND U.L.
REV. 53.
3. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 97. See also White, What Can Parents Do
About Unsavory TV Shows?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 19, 1978, at 83.
4. R. LIEBERT, J. NEALE & E. DAVIDSON, THE EARLY WINDOW: EFFECTS OF TELEVISION
ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH at xv (1973) [hereinafter cited as EARLY WINDOW].
5. The Annenberg School of Communications at the University of Pennsylvania reports

that there are more than seven acts of violence per hour on television between nine and eleven
every night, nearly four per hour'during the Family Viewing Hour (8-9 p.m. E.S.T.), and over
sixteen per hour on Saturday mornings. Sex and Violence on TV Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Communications ofthe House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 21, 62 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as Sex and Violence on TV]. See also The
War Against Television Violence, Bus. & Soc'Y REV., Fall 1977, at 25. But see P. HIGGINS & M.
RAY, TELEVISION'S ACTION ARSENAL: WEAPON USE IN PRIME TIME 35 (1978) (study revealed
less violence than researchers had expected; "injuries were extremely antiseptic and victims rarely

died").
6. See, e.g., EARLY WINDOW, supra note 4, at 34; P. HIGGINS & M. RAY, supra note 5, at 3840; FCC REPORT ON THE BROADCAST OF VIOLENT, INDECENT, AND OBSCENE MATERIAL, 51

F.C.C.2d 418, 418 (1975); Note, The Regulation of Televised Violence, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1293
(1974).
Those claiming that television violence is imitated are quick to point to myriad alleged acts of
imitation. See EARLY WINDOW, supra note 4, at 1-3; W. SCHRAMM, J. LYLE & E. PARKER, TELEVISION IN THE LIVES OF OUR CHILDREN 164 (1961) [hereinafter cited as LIVES OF OUR CHILDREN]; Sex and Violence on TV, supra note 5, at 29-30 (statement of Leo S. Singer); Note, The
Regulation of Televised Violence, supra, at 1295 n.23.
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vision violence should therefore be regulated has continued for over
twenty years,7 and shows no signs of abating.
Efforts to control violence on television may be divided into three
main areas: (1) government regulation, the traditional method 8 ; (2)
public activism, a method by which a vocal consuming public makes its
desires known in the market place; and (3)judicial decision, an indirect
method that attempts to hold the networks accountable for specific acts
of violence. This Comment, in evaluating these alternative approaches
to controlling violence on television, will show that both current psychological knowledge and the first amendment preclude holding the
networks accountable for violent acts by viewers; that, although some
forms of indirect government regulation could be justified consistent
with the first amendment, government regulation should not be used
because of the impediments to free speech; that deregulation, by allowing competition to fully develop the technological advances recently
made, has the potential to defuse the impact of television violence by
providing a wide range of nonviolent alternatives; and that, even if deregulation does not solve the problem of television violence, a vocal
public that makes its desires known to the broadcasters is the optimal
method of controlling television violence because it best balances both
effectiveness and potential infringements on the first amendment.
I.

RECENT CASES-ATTEMPTS TO HOLD NETWORKS ACCOUNTABLE
FOR EFFECTS OF TELEVISION VIOLENCE ON MINORS

Plaintiff and defendant in two recent cases, OliviaN. v. NBC,9 and
7. The controversy began in the 1950s. See, e.g., R. SHAYON, TELEVISION AND OUR CHIL19-23 (1951); SENATE SUBCOMM. TO INVESTIGATE JUVENILE DELIQUENCY, COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, TELEVISION AND JUVENILE DELIQUENCY, S. Doc. No. 1466, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1956).
8. Congressional interest in television violence has been regular for the past twenty-four
years. For an overview of this history, see SuBcoMM. ON COMMUNICATION, HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., VIOLENCE ON TELEVISION 1-3
(Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as VIOLENCE REPORT]; Note, supra note 6, at 1291 n.2.
Congress has held hearings on televised violence as recently as the fall of 1977. VIOLENCE REDREN

PORT, .rupra.

Demands on the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) have been similarly consistent, as demonstrated by the 25,000 letters of complaint in 1974. FCC REPORT ON THE BROADCAST OF VIOLENT, INDECENT, AND OBSCENE MATERIALS, 51 F.C.C.2d 418, 418-19 (1975). The
FCC, however, has refused to use the provisions of the Communications Act to control violence in
program content, id at 419, and Congress has done little more than agree that there is a problem.
See, e.g., VIOLENCE REPORT, supra, at 16 (additional comments of Rep. Thomas Laken) ("Congress has sufficient grounds to be concerned," but Congress should do no more than encourage
others to do something).
9. 74 Cal. App. 3d 383, 141 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1977), cer. deniedsub nom. NBC v. Niemi, 98 S.

Ct. 1657 (1978).
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Zamora v. State,'" respectively, sought unsuccessfully to hold the net-

works responsible for crimes committed by youthful viewers. Although
these cases did not directly seek to reduce the level of violence on television, they would have had that result had they succeeded."

As one of its special features in the fall of 1974, NBC presented an
8 p.m. broadcast of "Born Innocent," a much-publicized television
movie about life in a girls reform school.' 2 One five-minute scene

graphically portrayed four girls raping a young girl with the wooden

handle of a plumber's helper.' 3 Four days later, four California minors

raped a nine-year-old girl with a discarded beer bottle.' 4 The victim
and her mother charged that this act was committed in imitation of the
rape scene in "Born Innocent." 5 They brought suit, in Olivia N. v.
NBC,'6 seeking eleven million dollars in actual and punitive dam-

ages' 7 against NBC for negligently showing this scene at a time when

the network knew or should have known that minors likely to imitate
what they saw were inthe audience. 8

At the original trial, prior to impanelment of a jury, NBC moved
tliat the court decide the "constitutional fact" of "incitement."' 19 The

trial judge viewed the film and found as a "constitutional fact" that the
film "did not advocate or encourage violent and depraved acts and thus

did not constitute an incitement."2

Finding the scene, therefore,

within the protection of the first amendment, he entered judgment for
10. 361 So. 2d 776 (Fla. App. 1978).
11. If plaintiff had been successful in Olivia N., the network would have been held directly
liable for the effect of violence in its broadcast. Because of the difficulties of knowing what scenes
of violence would be imitated, violence could not have continued on television in the face of this
liability. If defendant in Zamora had been successful, in effect, the responsibility for a case of
insanity would have been placed on the networks. Although this would not necessarily lead to a
reduction in violence, it would have provided a very strong case for those calling for control.
12. NEWSWEEK, August 14, 1978, at 41.
13. 74 Cal. App. 3d at 386, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
14. Id at 386-87, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 512. Sharon Smith, age fifteen, raped Olivia with a discarded beer bottle while a fifteen-year-old boy and two younger girls watched. Ms. Smith subsequently spent three years in prison for this act. NEWSWEEK,August 14, 1978, at 41.
15. 74 Cal. App. 3d at 387, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
16. 74 Cal. App. 3d 383, 141 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1977), cerl. deniedsub nom. NBC v. Niemi, 98 S.
Ct. 1657 (1978).
17. New York Times, Aug. 8, 1978, at A12, col. 1-2.
18. 74 Cal. App. 3d at 386-87, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 512; New York Times, Aug. 8, 1978, at A12,
col. 1-2. James Duffy, President of ABC, stated in a speech on Oct. 23, 1974 that "the race for
audience ratings too often blinds us to our basic responsibilities .... Yes, a program like 'Born
Innocent' should be shown. But, no, it should not be shown at such an eirly hour... when
children more often than not control the dial." Quotedin Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v.
FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1095 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
19. 74 Cal. App. 3d at 387, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
20. Id
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Plaintiff had contended that she could show actionable injuries in
spite of first amendment protections, and, on appeal, the California
Court of Appeals held that the trial court's action in making fact findings and rendering judgment violated plaintiff's constitutional right to
trial by jury.2 2 At the new trial, the judge ruled that, in order to overcome the network's first amendment rights, plaintiff would have to
prove both actual incitement and that NBC intended to incite rape
when it showed the film. 23 Plaintiff argued for a definition of incitement that would be satisfied solely by the negligent stimulation of the
real life crime.2' The judge, however, refused to change the traditional
definition of incitement, which is that the speech must be directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and that it must be likely
to produce or incite such action. 25 Plaintiff acknowledged that it would
be impossible to prove the network's intent in light of the judge's ruling
and, therefore, did not contest NBC's motion to dismiss in the face of
the judge's ruling.2 6

In Zamora v. State, 27 defendant, a sixteen-year old male, and a
friend were burglarizing an eighty-three-year old neighbor's apartment
when the neighbor returned and recognized him. When the neighbor

threatened to call the police, Zamora shot and killed her.28 The defense argued that a steady diet of violence on television had caused
Zamora to become "legally insane" at the moment of the murder-that
the countless incidents of violence he had seen on television had so
21. Id
22. Id at 389, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 514. The court did note that whether "Born Innocent" fell
outside the first amendment might be a question of law when the facts were not disputed, and that

if the jury found for the plaintiff the court would then have to determine whether that verdict
"could be sustained against a first amendment challenge to the jury's determination of a 'constitutional fact.'" Id The court similarly noted that the trial court could have made the determination
that the film did not constitute an incitement in connection with a motion for summary judgment,
but such a motion had earlier been denied by another judge and no such motion was pending
whenjudgment was rendered. Id See also Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974) (juries do
not have "unbridled discretion" to declare a film obscene and outside first amendment protection).
23. New York Times, Aug. 8, 1978, at A12, col. 1-2.
24. Plaintiff could not circumvent the first amendment's applicability even to negligence actions. See text accompanying note 55 infra.
25. 74 Cal. App. 3d at 389, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 513 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447 (1969); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973)).
26. New York Times, Aug. 8, 1978, at A12, col. 1-2. Plaintiff would have had trouble proving that the assailant even saw "Born Innocent." The assailant said that she had not seen it,
although she had heard talk about it at school. Plaintiff maintained that that alone was sufficient
to hold the network liable. NEWSWEEK, August 14, 1978, at 41.
27. 361 So. 2d 776 (Fla. App. 1978).
28. TfVon Trial 13 (PBS Broadcast Transcript 1978) [hereinafter cited as TVon Trial].
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corrupted his values that he did not know right from wrong.29 The

defense produced both psychiatric testimony that Zamora was a sociopath3" and testimony that he had watched six
to eight hours of televi3
sion per day from the ages of five to fifteen. 1

With this background, the defense tried to show that sociopaths
and emotionally disturbed children are so desensitized to violence by
television that they should be granted a defense equivalent to that of
intoxication.32 The court ruled, however, that the reliability of the tests
tendered by the defense was neither reasonably demonstrated nor gen-

erally accepted in the scientific community.33 The jury, which was not
allowed to hear testimony about the effects of televised violence on

viewers,34 found Zamora guilty after only two hours of deliberations.35
These cases illustrate that without even considering the first

amendment several elements must be proved before a network can be
held civilly liable or a new insanity defense created. To hold a network
civilly liable for an alleged imitative act, the court must find that the
network violated a duty of reasonable care. To establish this duty, it
must be shown that viewing television violence has an adverse effect on

minors generally, and, unless strict liability is to be imposed, that it is
possible to know which scenes have that effect. To show a violation of

this duty, moreover, the party seeking damages must show that the specific violent scene on television actually caused the imitative violence.
Similarly, to create a new insanity defense, it would be necessary to
29. Id at 22-24.
30. Id at 20-21. A sociopath was characterized as "a person who is emotionally cool, calloused, has little in the way of remorse or guilt, has little or no ability to feel for other people, and
otherwise presents pretty much as a normal person." Id at 20 (testimony of Dr. Walter Reid).
31. Id at 14-16, 31. The defense also introduced evidence that Zamora idolized Kojak, a
television detective, to the point of wanting his head shaved. 1d at 17. "Kojak" was rated by the
Parent Teacher Association as the most violent show on television. New TV Season: Less Sex,
Less Violence, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., September 11, 1978, at 32.
32. TV on Trial, supra note 28, at 22-25.
33. Id at 25. The defense's own witness, Dr. Margaret Thomas, admitted that she knew of
no study showing a subject who was so affected by a television show that he did not know the
difference between right and wrong, nor was she aware of any study linking television violence
with insanity. Id at 26-28 (testimony of Dr. Margaret Thomas).
34. Id at 28.
35. Id at 45-46. It was apparent from post-trial interviews with the jury that they did not
accept the insanity defense. Id The jurors made the following statements:
Maybe that's all he could come up with.
It has some influence on children, probably, but so did movies in my day.
I endorse any and all television. It's police shows, what it is doing is bringing the
every daY violence that occurs out on the street into your home and you're getting more
educated.
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demonstrate that television violence generally has an adverse effect on
minors and that the specific act of violence in question was caused by
exposure to television violence. Current psychological evidence, however, does not provide proof of these necessary elements, and, even if it
did, the imposition of civil liability in such cases would violate the first
amendment absent a revision of traditional first amendment definitions.
.4

PsychologicalEvidence on the Effects of Television Violence on
Minors

Many factors influence the effect that television violence has on a
minor. Television serves as a surrogate peer or parent as the child develops, offering content, mode, tone and images that interact with him
to correct, refine and clarify his thoughts and feelings.36 The child's
age, 3 7 personality, 38 environment 39 and reason for watching4" all obvi36. Berry, Television and the Urban Child- Some EducationalPolicy Implications, 10 ED. &
URB. Soc'Y 31, 42 (1977). Young children watch television, and they learn from observation just
as they learn from their parents and their peers. See, e.g., id; Murray, supra note 2, at 291; Note,
supra note 6, at 1293-96.
"The child's learning during the first five or six years sets the foundations for his lifelong
patterns of behavior and for further learning," SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 56,

and, to a large number of children, TV is the society at large from which they learn. Speech by L.
Pogrebin, reprintedin E. KAYE, THE FAMILY GUIDE TO CHILDREN'S TELEVISION 15 (1974).

37. Television becomes less important to children as they become adolescents as it fails to
meet their altered social needs. H. HIMMELWEIT, A. OPPENHEIM & P. VINCE, TELEVISION AND
THE CHILD 100 (1958) [hereinafter cited as TELEVISION AND THE CHILD]. Even some adolescents,
however, do not understand that television is a world of make-believe. See, e.g., EARLY WINDOW,
supra note 4, at 30-31 (report showed that 46% of adolescents interviewed felt that crime shows
"tell about life the way it really is"); SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note I, at 12 ("very
young have difficulty comprehending the contextual setting in which violent acts are depicted and
do not grasp the meaning of cues or labels concerning the make-believe character of violent episodes in fictional programs"). See generally, Cohen, Television and the Perception of Reality,
EDUC. DIGEST, March 1977, at 10.
38. See, e.g., TELEVISION AND THE CHILD, supra note 37, at 30-34; LIVEs OF OUR CHILDREN,
supra note 6, at 413. Whether the viewer tends to be uncritical of and attached to the medium will
influence its effect on him, TELEVISION AND THE CHILD, supra note 37, at 18, as will whether he
has the psychological resources of the stable mind. See also SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra

note I, at 32.
The degree to which the show is linked to the viewer's immediate needs and interests will also
affect the impact of the show on him. TELEVISION AND THE CHILD, supra note 37, at 261 (viewer
more likely to be affected the greater is his interest in that type of information); LIVES OF OUR
CHILDREN, supra note 6, at 142-43.

The impact of televised violence will further be influenced by the degree to which the viewer
is already frustrated and aggressive. See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note I, at 18;
LIVES OF OUR CHILDREN, supra note 6, at 161; Howitt, The Effects of Television on Children, in
CHILDREN AND TELEVISION, supra note 2, at 320, 325; Kniveton, Social Learning and Imitation in
Relation to Television, in CHILDREN AND TELEVISION, supra note 2, at 236, 256.

Finally, people perceive what they want to see on television, extracting and molding what is
presented on the screen to their own needs and interests. See, e.g., Holland, supra note 2, at 55.
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ously affect this interaction and the impact that televised violence will
have on him. Similarly, although television offers a view of the world

and how to deal with it,41 including role models to copy,42 no authority
would argue that modeling behavior from television is the sole cause of
violent behavior, nor that everyone receives the same messages from

the screen. A child's interactions with others will obviously have a
more pronounced effect on his tendency to use violence and on his de-

velopment than will his interactions with television.
Despite this variety of factors, the evidence does indicate that television does have some effect on some minors some of the time.43 It is
questionable, however, whether this evidence rises to the level of imposing a duty on the networks or of constituting a cumulative effect
See generally I. SHAW & D. NEWELL, VIOLENCE ON TELEVISION 133 (1972), Abel & Beninson,
Perception of TV Program Violence by Children and Mothers, 20 J. BROADCASTING 355 (1976).

39. If the child is not already supplied with a set of values against which to judge the violence
he sees on television, for instance, the violence will have a stronger effect. See e.g., TELEVISION
AND THE CHILD, supra note 37, at 18 ("Television tended to make no impact where the child could
turn for information to his immediate environment, parents, and friends."); Howitt, The Effects of
Television on Children, in CHILDREN AND TELEVISION, supra note 2, at 320-324 ("Only when we
can expect that the individual has no pre-existing tendencies or when there are circumstances
particularly conducive to change can we expect the mass media to have much effect on the audience."); Kniveton, Social Learningand Imitation in Relation to Television, in CHILDREN AND TEL-

supra note 2, at 237, 262. ("The better able the child to develop his own interests, and the
broader his own experience, the less susceptible he will be to a model's influence whether that
model be parent, peer or television character."). Some empirical support has shown that first-born
and only children who lack salient behavior models are more likely to adopt behavior modeled on
TV. See D. HowiTr & G. CUMBERBATCH, MASS MEDIA, VIOLENCE AND SOCIETY (1975).
40. Youths watch television, for example, to learn, to pass time, to forget, for companionship,
EVISION,

for social utility, for arousal and for relaxation. See, eg., Brown, Children's Uses and Television,
CHILDREN AND TELEVISION, supra note 2, at 116-36.

in

These differing reasons for viewing obviously cause differences in how closely the show is
watched and how much of an impact it will have. Before age six children understand only what
they view with full attention. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note I, at 3. Cf.Rubin, Television Usages,Attitudes and Viewing Behaviors of Childrenand Adolescents, 21 J. BROADCASTING

355, 366-67 (1977) (discussion of changing affinity with television as the child ages).
41. "[V]iewers believe they are learning about the world, how to handle social situations, and
how to cope with personal problems [from television]." SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supranote
1, at 95.
42. The learning of behavior from observation, including observation of a model, is denoted
the "observational learning" process. See, eg., EARLY WINDOW, supra note 4, at 39-43; Note,
supra note 6, at 1293.
43. The most widely accepted summary on the effects of television violence on children was
that presented in LIVES OF OUR CHILDREN, supra note 6, at I ("For some children, under some
conditions, some television is harmful. For other children under the same conditions, or for the
same children under other conditions, it may be beneficial. For most children, under most conditions, most television is probably neither particularly harmful nor particularly beneficial."). See
also SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 20; VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6-7.
For a general overview of the experimental evidence, see EARLY WINDOW, supra note 4, at 71-87;
Note, supra note 6.

104
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sufficient to support an insanity defense. 44 The methodology of proving a cause and effect relationship in particular cases has not been developed to the point at which it is generally accepted in the scientific
community or readily demonstrable. 45 The tremendous number of
variables that cause a person to act as he does pose an almost insurmountable barrier to the necessary proof that a particular episode of
television violence was likely to be imitated 46 or that it actually caused
a viewer to commit a similar act of violence.4 7
44. Even if television violence does affect the young viewer, in order for him actually to use
violence as a result of seeing it on television he must identify with that behavior, learn it or link it
to his reality. See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 101, 157-60. If the modelig cues are acquired, there are three possible results: (1) the viewer may be more likely to perform imitative acts; (2) he may be less likely to perform imitative acts; or (3) there may be no
performance changes. EARLY WINDOW, supra note 4, at 40-42. In addition, there are at least four
different ways to view the interaction that occurs between television and the viewer, each with
differing implications for what a child will learn from watching television. See McQuail, Alternafive Models ofTelevision Influence, in CHILDREN AND TELEVISION, supra note 2, at 343, 348-58.
45. TV on Trial, supra note 28, at 25. See generally authorities cited note 43 supra.
46. Although there is some evidence as to what types of contexts will most likely cause imitation, the evidence is not conclusive enough to provide workable guidelines for the television industry to follow. See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, upra note I, at 17-18.
The complexities of developmental processes in childhood and adolescence and the
variations from one individual to another make it difficult to predict the effects of any
single carefully controlled stimulus upon behavior and impossible to predict fully the
effects of the wide variety of visual and auditory stimuli offered in television programs.
Id at 37; f I. SHAW & D. NEWELL, supra note 38, at 174-75 (different ages perceive violence on
television differently). See generally Note, supra note 6, at 1305-06. See also EARLY WINDOW,
supra note 4, at 61-66 (experiment showing that for children the context of the violence is irrelevant). Some studies have found a correlation between the way violence is presented and aggressive behavior. McQuail, Alternative Models of Television Influence, in CHILDREN AND
TELEVISION, supra note 2, at 343, 356.
If the person committing the violence also suffers or is punished for committing the violence,
there is less likelihood of imitation. Note, supra note 6, at 1305. A painful death scene depresses
aggression among viewers, but if the carnage and pain are highlighted, previously angered viewers
become more aggressive. Id See also Kniveton, Social Learning and Imitation in Relation to
Television, in CHILDREN AND TELEVISION, supra note 2, at 236, 262. A role model who uses
violence, and who is presented as intelligent, socially and technically competent, and with social
status, carries more impact than one without these qualities. Note, supra note 6, at 1305. See also
G. LESSER, CHILDREN AND TELEVISIoN-LESSONS FROM SESAME STREET 23-25 (1974) (use of
role models to teach children).
47. See generally Howitt, The Effects of Television on Children, in CHILDREN AND TELEVISION, supra note 2, at 320, 328-34 (effects of mass media in a situation outside of the laboratory
cannot be measured); Kniveton, SocialLearningand Imitationin Relation to Television, in CHILDREN AND TELEVISION, supra note 2, at 237, 262 ("Social learning is a complex, long-term process
and it is difficult for the social scientist to attribute changes in behaviour and attitudes to any
particular one of life's many varied experiences."); Note, The Family Viewing Hour. An Assault on
the FirstAmendment, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 935, 974-79, 989 (1977) (evidence of the effect of
televised violence is not strong enough to make regulation of that violence a "compelling governmental interest," which would be necessary before "a fundamental interest such as that of freedom
of expression" could be overridden); Holland, supra note 2, at 61 (more research needed to resolve
issue whether television causes crime); see also The WarAgainst Television Violence, Bus. & Soc'Y
REv., Fall 1977, at 25 (contrast of views on whether a cause and effect relationship has been
sufficiently demonstrated).
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For example, to have let the theory advanced in OliviaN. go to the
jury would have entailed letting the jury engage, to a large degree, in
speculation. The alleged act of imitation occurred four days after the
show,4 and, in fact, the primary assailant said that she had not even
seen the show, although she had heard talk about it at school.4 9 Given

the number of variables that cause a person to act as he does, it would
be difficult to infer from this evidence that the televised scene caused
the act in question in order to hold the network liable.
The theory advanced in Zamora-thata lifetime of viewing violence caused the act in question-similarly involved speculation. The
effect of television violence on viewers is not as predictable as, for instance, that of alcohol.50 The consumption of alcohol causes a physiological reaction whereby the brain and body are directly impaired
through a chemical reaction. This reaction occurs in all consumers of
alcohol. 5 ' Television violence, on the other hand, involves psychological perceptions that are influenced by the viewer's own context. 52 It
does not involve a direct measurable reaction. The experimental and
correlational studies on television violence show that the effect is
neither certain nor measurable. Until a cause and effect relationship
can be much more clearly shown, the effect of television violence on
viewers is insufficient to support an insanity defense.
Because the psychological evidence of the effects of television violence on minors is not presently sufficient to put the networks directly
on notice of what is acceptable and what is not, the only remaining
argument is that the total amount of harm caused by television violence
is significant enough to justify the imposition of strict liability. Strict
liability, however, is unacceptable because the evidence does not support the conclusion that the amount of harm caused by television violence outweighs the potential "chilling effect" on otherwise socially
justified speech.53 This is also the reason that civil liability cannot co48. TVon TrialAgain, NEWSWEEK, August 14, 1978, at 41.
49. 1d
50. See generally ALCOHOL AND THE IMPAIRED DRIVER (1970). Although drunkenness does

not qualify as insanity in most jurisdictions, "chronic insanity resulting from inebriation will exonerate an individual from full responsibility for his acts. Drunkenness is no excuse for crime and
negligence, but intoxication has been admitted in evidence to show lack of intent or even of
knowledge of the facts in criminal action." Id at 13.
51. See generallyU.S. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, ALCOHOL & ALCOHOLISM

(1967). A .05% blood alcohol level leads to sedation or tranquility, a .05 to .15% level generally
causes a lack of coordination, a .15 to .20% level causes obvious intoxication, a .3 to .4% level may
produce unconsciousness, and a level greater than .5% may be fatal. Id at 21.
52. See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
53. See text accompanying notes 90-97 infra.
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exist with the first amendment. 4

B. Television Violence and the FirstAmendment
Not only was there insufficient proof of causation to hold NBC
civilly liable in OliviaN., there was also an inability to circumvent the
first amendment. Although the lawsuit involved private parties, action
by the court in awarding damages would have involved state action to
which the first amendment would have applied.-5

The plaintiff thus

had to show either that television violence fell into an unprotected category of speech or that a new category of unprotected speech should
have been created,

In determining whether a category of speech is to receive absolute
first amendment protection, or some lesser degree of protection, courts
weigh the state's interest against the constitutional protection given free
expression. 6 For each category of speech the courts consider how the

speech in question affects the political process, 57 whether it provides
54. This conclusion does not mean, however, that no problem exists or that nothing should
be done. Former Surgeon General Jesse Steinfeld summarized the evidence as follows:
The data on social phenomena such as television and violence and on aggressive behavior will never be clear enough for all social scientists to agree on the formulation of a
succinct statement of causality. But there comes a time when the data are sufficient to
justify action. That time has come.
Hearingson the Surgeon General'sReport by the ScientfficAdvisory Comm. on Television and Social
BehaviorBefore the Subcommrn on Communications ofthe Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 29 (Comm. Print 1972).
55. 74 Cal. App. 3rd at 387-88, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 513. The courts cannot help private persons
take actions that would violate the Constitution if done by the state. The "determination of government action. . . hinges on the weighing of a number of variables, principally the degree of
government involvement, the offensiveness of the conduct, and the value of preserving a private
sector free from the constitutional requirements applicable to government institutions." Wahba v.
New York University, 249 F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 1974). "In keeping with these principles (though
usually not articulating them) the courts have been quick to characterize resulting conduct as
governmental when the government has been somehow involved with racial discrimination or
other offensive conduct." Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1135
(C.D. Cal. 1976). See generallyNew York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) ("What
a state may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the
reach of its civil law of libel."); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (court cannot subject
white property owner who sold land to member of minority race to monetary damages for breaching a racially restrictive covenant); Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (court cannot enforce
covenant forbidding sale to member of racial minority).
56. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (where freedom of speech is
abridged, courts "weigh the circumstances and . . . appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation"). See generally Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-03
(D.C. Cir. 1968). Compare the Court's opinion in Konigsburg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S.
36, 49-51 (196 1) with Justice Black's belief in the "absolute" nature of the first amendment, id at
60-61 (Black, J., dissenting).
57. For examples of discussions of the importance of free speech, see Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) ("speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the
essence of self-government"); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (historic function of
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information on matters of public importance,5 whether it is a form of
self-expression,5 9 whether it contributes to an exchange of ideas,60 and
what effect the removal of first amendment protection will have on
other speech.6 Under this analysis, several types of speech have been
held, in varying degrees, to fall outside first amendment protection.
These include obscenity,6 2 libel,6 3 fraud,64 solicitation of crime,65
"fighting words, 66 conspiracy 67 and incitement.68 In each case the utterances are so devoid of social value or threaten harm to others to such
an extent that the right to first amendment protection is outweighed.6 9
Television violence, however, is used to convey social messages: it contributes to an exchange of ideas, and it provides information on matters
of public importance.70 All violence cannot be removed from the profree speech); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (country founded on principle of free speech, which is only way to arrive at truth), overruledon other
grounds, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas"). See generally Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J.

877, 878-86 (1963).
58. See, e.g., Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
59. See, e.g., id

60. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
61. See, e.g., Banzhafv. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
62. Eg., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463
(1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
63. Eg., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974). Cf.N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (media has first amendment
protection from defamation actions brought by public figures unless libelous statement was made
with actual malice).
64. E.g., Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178 (1948).
65. E.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Fox v. Washington, 236
U.S. 273 (1915).
66. E.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
67. E.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S.
204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
68. E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
69. "It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly out-weighed by the social interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (footnote omitted).
70. See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 190. "The experience of humanistic scholars suggests that, for adults at least, violent content in fiction is sometimes a vehicle
for presenting to a general audience 'messages' about important social and cultural issues. The
authors and producers need not be fully aware that they are doing this." Id The Oedipus plays,
for instance, did not appeal to the Greeks primarily because of their violence. Id The purpose of
"Born Innocent" was to reveal the situation in a girls reform school; the violent depiction undoubtedly made that presentation much stronger. See also K. GRUNDY & M. WEINSTEIN, THE
IDEOLOGIES OF VIOLENCE (1974) (violence itself justified in political context).
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tection of the first amendment without a clear demonstration of overriding danger from its continued protection.
It can be argued, nonetheless, that some violence is used solely for
its own sake, in which case it may serve none of these purposes, and
that this violence can be removed from first amendment protection
without affecting other speech in the same way that courts have removed obscenity from first amendment protection without adversely
affecting other references to sex.7 1 Although the Supreme Court has
never dealt directly with this issue, in Winters v. New York,7 2 it struck

down a New York law that had been held to prohibit the distribution
of a magazine principally composed of articles dealing with criminal
73
deeds of bloodlust that might incite violent crimes against the person
as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.74 The Court held that the
statutory prohibition on articles and pictures "so massed as to incite to
crime" was so indefinite that it would be impossible for the actor to
know where the line between the permissible and the impermissible
was drawn; thus, the law unconstitutionally abridged freedom of
speech.75 The Court distinguished the terms "obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, indecent or disgusting" as having acquired definite meanings
through long usage.76
Justice Frankfurter strongly argued in dissent in Winters that the
legislature could reasonably believe that a type of "massing of print
and pictures" was an effective means to incite to crime and that it was
not for the Court to impose its beliefs on the legislatures of over half
71. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) (distinction between sex that is
used in artistic, literary and scientific works and obscenity).
72. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
73. N.Y. PENAL LAW, § 1141(2) (McKinney 1941), as construed by the New York State
Court of Appeals.
74. 333 U.S. at 519. But see Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915) (law punishing publica-

tions encouraging an actual breach of the law upheld). For examples of state courts upholding
such laws prior to Winters, see State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18, 22, 46 A. 409, 412 (1900) (law

banning distribution of material principally composed of "criminal news, police reports, pictures
and stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust, and crime" upheld as it "is impossible to say ... that such
publications do not tend to public demoralization, as truly as descriptions of mere obscenity");
Strohm v. People, 160 l. 582, 43 N.E. 622 (1896) (conviction for disseminating to minors magazine principally composed of stories of crime and bloodshed upheld without discussing constitutionality).

75. 333 U.S. at 518-20. The Court noted that a legislature could plainly extend the limits of
the impermissible if it did not transgress the constitutional boundaries of free speech. Id at 520.
The Court further found that the words "so massed as to incite to crime" could "become meaningful only by concrete instances." Id at 519. It did not indicate how these instances were to transpire once the law was invalidated. Justice Frankfurter argued in dissent that the majority was

"confusing want of certainty as to the outcome of different prosecutions for similar conduct, with
want of definiteness in what the law prohibits." Id at 535 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
76. Id at 518.
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the states that had such laws.7 7 He also noted that the Court did not
hesitate to decide what type of literature amounted to obscenity.7 8
There are differences between violence and obscenity, however,
and both the terms "so massed as to incite to crime" and "violence used
for its own sake" pose problems that are not found in the area of obscenity. Although obscenity has been socially outlawed in literature
throughout history, violence has not been similarly treated.79 There is
guidance for the producer concerning what is obscene and what is not
in the definitions that have developed during the years of controversy
surrounding the issue.8" As was noted by the Court in Winters, however, there is little guidance about what violence would be acceptable. 8 '
Further, the only speech adversely affected by regulating obscenity
should be that that appeals to prurient interests and has little social
value.8 2 Any and all violence, on the other hand, would be chilled by
removing televised violence from first amendment protection because
77. Id at 533 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
It would be sheer dogmatism in a field not within the professional competence ofjudges
to deny the. . . legislature the right to believe that the intent of the types of publications
which it has proscribed is to cater to morbid and immature minds-whether chronologically or permanently immature. It would be sheer dogmatism to deny that in some instances. . . deeply imbedded, unconscious impulses may be discharged into destructive
and often fatal action.
Id at 529-30.
In the related area of obscenity, the Court, in Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973), noted the arguable correlation between obscenity and crime and stated that the "interest of
the public in the quality of life and the total community environment, the tone of commerce in the
great city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself' are justifications for regulating obscenity.
Id at 58. The Court further stated:
The sum of experience . . . affords an ample basis for legislatures to conclude that a
sensitive, key relationship of human existance, central to family life, community welfare,
and the development of human personality, can be debased or distorted by crass commercial exploitation of sex. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits a State from reaching
such a conclusion and acting on it legislatively simply because there is no conclusive
evidence or empirical data.
Id at 63. This same language could arguably also be applied to television violence, but the Court
has not done so.
78. 333 U.S. at 533 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). "What gives judges competence to say that
while print and pictures may be constitutionally outlawed because judges deem them 'obscene,'
print and pictures which in the judgment of half the States of the Union operate as incitements to
crime enjoys constitutional prerogative?" Id (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
79. See authorities cited note 70 supra.
80. See, e.g., 333 U.S. at 518. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
81. 333 U.S. at 518.
82. Artistic, literary and scientific references to sex do not appeal to prurient interests and are
protected by the first amendment. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,487 (1957). See also FCC
v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S. Ct. 3026, 3037 (1978) ("At most, the Commission's definition of
indecency will deter only the broadcasting of patently offensive references to excretory and sexual
organs and activities.").
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the contours of the concept of violence used for its own sake are too
indefinite to limit without seriously curtailing all violence on television. 3
Because, as the Winters Court recognized, certain types of violence
cannot be removed from first amendment protection without curtailing
all violence, the question becomes whether all violence falls into a currently unprotected category of speech or whether the harm caused by
television violence in its entirety outweighs its benefits to society so that
a new category of unprotected speech should be created, The closest
category of speech not protected by the first amendment into which
television violence might fall is incitement or advocacy. Advocacy can
be controlled by the state only when it is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and when it is likely to produce or incite
such action."4 Even when incitement is present, the "substantive evil
must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high
before utterances can be punished."85 All ideas constitute an incitement to some degree, but the fact that someone may take an idea and
implement or copy it does not remove that speech from the protection
83. This was aptly demonstrated by the attempt to curtail violence during the Family Viewing Hour (FVH), in which the standard used was "we'll know it when we see it." Writers Guild of
America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1149 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Note, supranote 47, at 98285. That standard has led, and can only lead, to a spirit of censorship. See, e.g., VIOLENCE
REPORT, supra note 8, at 33-35 (separate views of Rep. Henry A. Waxman) ("Because family
viewing was a 'negative guideline' in that the networks could never be more explicit about it than
knowing what they did not want, producers 'pulled back' on some stories because they 'didn't
want to have trouble.' ").

Although Justice Stewart has stated with regard to obscenity that "I know it when I see it,"
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring), differences between television violence and obscenity make this standard much more damaging to the first amendment in
the area of televised violence. See text accompanying notes 86-89 infra.
84. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969);
see D. TOOHEY, R. MARKS & A. LUTZKER, LEGAL PROBLEMS IN BROADCASTING 96 (1974)
(courts will limit violence only on a showing of "clear and present danger"). See also Terminiello
v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949) ("the alternative [of less stringent requirements for actual danger] would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or
community groups").
This definition of incitement apparently includes intent as an essential element, as noted by
the court in Olivia N. See New York Times, Aug. 8, 1978, at A12, col. 1-2. The Supreme Court
has stated that teaching the need for violence without actually seeking the immediate instigation
of that violence does not constitute incitement, even if someone should act on that teaching, see
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,448 (1969), and the same result should follow for portrayals of
violence. It is unnecessary to consider this argument, however, because the immediacy of incitement requirement cannot be met. See text accompanying notes 86-89 infra.
85. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941); see United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201,
a]j'd,341 U.S. 494, 510 (1957) ("In each case [the court] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil',
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid
danger.").
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of the first amendment.8 6 In the case of television violence, the substantive evil is serious; the dangers of inciting murders and rapes are
not to be taken lightly. The degree of imminence, however, is not
high-viewers do not generally rush out to imitate what they have seen

on television. In Olivia N., for instance, the alleged act of imitation
occurred four days after the show,8 7 while in Zamora it was argued that
a lifetime of viewing led to murder.88 This will not satisfy the immedi-

acy required by the traditional definition of incitement.89
Before the incitement definition can be reshaped to include televi-

sion violence, or before an entirely new category of unprotected speech
is created, it must be shown that the potential harm from television
violence outweighs the potential adverse effect that removing it from

first amendment protection would have. The potential harm is increased crime and a nation insensitive to violence; the potential adverse

effect of nonprotection is a totally bland television spectrum.90 There is
no way to determine when violence on television is "so massed as to

incite to crime" or when it will likely be imitated. In fact, there is no
agreement on what constitutes violence on the screen. 9 1 To hold the

networks potentially liable anytime anything was imitated would prohibit not only the showing of violent police action programs but also
"Roots" and the works of Shakespeare. 92 Although some studies have
86. See, e.g., Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959) (New York law denying license to films that are "obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, [or] of such char-

acter that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime" held unconstitutional as
applied
87.
88.
89.

to prevent advocacy of the idea that adultery may be acceptable).
NEWSWEEK, August 14, 1978, at 41.
TVon Trial, supra note 28, at 5.
"There may come a time when the studies become so conclusive that televised violence

causes aggressive behavior that the regulation of violence may fit a recognized exception to censorship prohibitions for material inciting a crime." Note, First.4mendmentRights ofthe Broadcast
Licensee and the Public Interest in EntertainmentProgramming, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 262, 281-82

(1978). That time has not yet arrived.
90. The networks could not afford to show any violence in the face of $ 11 million lawsuits.
See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, August 14, 1978, at 41; VIOLENCE REPORT, supranote 8, at 33-35 (separate
views of Rep. Henry A. Waxman) (chilling effects of the Family Viewing Hour on television
production).
91. Compare violence is "the overt expression of physical force against others or self, or the
compelling of action against one's will on pain of being hurt or killed" (including accidental or
humorous incidents), SURGEON GENERAL's REPORT, supranote 1, at 5 with violence covers "any
act which may cause physical and/or psychological injury, hurt or death to persons, animals or
property, whether intentional or accidental," I. SHAW & D. NEWELL, supra note 38, at 3 and
violence is "that which is physically or psychologically injurious to another person or persons
whether intended or not, and whether successful or not," VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 4.
92. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, August 14, 1978, at 41-42 (David Gerber, producer of the television series "Police Woman": "'If a kid sees Peter Pan in a theatre and jumps off a roof, or if a kid
[,Vhere the hell
stabs somebody in the gut because he saw Shakespeare, there will be a suit....
will it stop?' ").
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begun to indicate what type of televised scenes are more likely to be
imitated, at present the networks would be acting blindly if they tried
to control only violence they thought would be imitated. 93
The harm from television violence, on the other hand, has not
been conclusively shown. It is impossible to determine how much of
any increase in crime is due to violence on television. 94 It is also almost
impossible to show that any specific act of violence occurred because of
what was shown on television.95 The evidence only shows that violence
on television does induce some violent behavior in some minors in
some instances.96 Although the results may be serious, until more evidence can be produced, this does not amount to a state interest sufficient to support the infringement of the first amendment that would
result from holding the networks civilly liable for acts of televised violence.9 7 Civil liability simply sweeps too broadly without hope of refinement. Although government regulation offers the potential for
more detailed control, it too runs into difficulty with the first amendment.
II.

GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF TELEVISION VIOLENCE

Soon after the introduction of radio it became obvious that some
type of regulation of this new medium was needed. 98 By 1927, the radio spectrum was in total chaos, with stations broadcasting on any frequency with any power.9 9 Congress responded with the Radio Act of
1927,100 which created the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) to promote use of the radio spectrum consistent with the public interest by
licensing stations to operate and by establishing rules for them to oper93. See notes 44-47 and accompanying text supra.
94. See Valenti, An Outlet for Artists, in The War Against Telesis/on Violence, Bus. AND
Soc'Y REv., Fall 1977, at 25, 35:
It is true that crime has increased, from a rate of 143 violent crimes per 100,000
population in 1935 to 481.5 per 100,000 in 1975. It is true that TV viewing is high, with

more than 70 million TV homes in America today. It is true that young people watch
TV in greater numbers than would have been conceived two decades ago. But logic
demands linkage, and the recounting of these figures is relevant only if they connect to
definite conclusions.
95. See text accompanying notes 43-47 supra.
96. See note 43 sunpra.
97. See, eg., Note, supra note 47, at 989 ("Until a more precise and substantial body of
evidence exists proving that televised violence affects a significant portion of the population ad-

versely, the government cannot and should not interfere with or regulate broadcast content.").
98. For a general summary of the problem, see NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-12

(1943).
99. See, e.g., id
100. Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
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ate under. 10 1 The provisions of this Act were incorporated into the
Communications Act of 1934,102 which replaced the FRC with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The basic purpose of the
in
FCC was the same as that of the FRC-to balance the public interest
10 3
broadcasting.
in
competition
free
of
system
a
the airwaves with
Although the ultimate choice of programming rests with the individual licensees," ° the FCC's role involves more than issuing licenses
and policing the stations to see that they do not interfere with each
others' transmissions.<Because of the limited number of frequencies, 0 5
section 307 of the 1934 Act provides that licenses are to be granted in
the "public interest, convenience and necessity."' 1 6 Because the public
interest requires some consideration of program content, the FCC is
not merely a traffic policeman, directing frequency allocation.' 0 7 It has
the authority to determine just what constitutes the public "convenience, interest or necessity." 0 It neither exceeds its power nor transgresses the first amendment "in interesting itself in general program
format and the kinds of programs broadcast by licensees."10 9 Section
326, however, prohibits the FCC from acting as a censor by providing
that "no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the
101. See generally NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212-13 (1943); Writers Guild of
America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 1976). Cf.Daly v. CBS, 309 F.2d
83, 85 (7th Cir. 1962) ("The basic purpose of the Act is regulation in the public interest and
creation of private rights.").
102. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976).
103. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973). Congress could have chosen
total government control but preferred to preserve the traditional journalistic role as far as possible. Id
104. See, e.g., Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1133-34 (C.D.
Cal. 1976).
105. Under the 1912 Radio Act, the Secretary of Commerce licensed all stations to operate
upon either 750 or 833 kilocycles. With the proliferation of stations, chaos ensued, and after 1924
the Secretary adopted the policy of assigning a specific frequency to each station. There were
more stations than available frequencies, however, to accommodate more stations, the Secretary
therefore limited the power and hours of operations of stations so that more might use the same
frequency. By 1925 there were almost 600 stations, every channel in the standard broadcast band
was occupied by at least one station, and there were 175 new applicants. NBC v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 211 (1943).
106. 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1970).
107. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943).
108. See, e.g., FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940); FRC v. Nelson
Brothers Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933); National Ass'n of Independent Television Producers & Distribs. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 526, 536 (2d Cir. 1975).
109. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969). See, e.g., Note, supra note
the absence of carefully defined categories of speech falling outside First Amend89. Yet, "[fin
ment protections, FCC regulation of program content has been permitted only insofar as it has
served to promote greater diversity in the broadcasting medium." Writers Guild of America,
West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
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Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by
means of radio communication." ' " 0
The FCC has interpreted its role as one of maintaining the balance

"between the preservation of a free competitive broadcast system...
and the reasonable restriction of that freedom inherent in the public
interest standard.""' In spite of repeated attempts" 2 to get the FCC to
regulate television violence, the agency has consistently maintained
that it has no authority over the actual content of entertainment programs," 3 and it has enforced the public interest standard solely by requiring that stations make a good faith effort to find and fulfill the
needs and interests of their communities.' l4 The FCC did, nonetheless,
coerce the networks into adopting the Family Viewing Hour (FVH) in
1974 by threatening government involvement in program content unless the industry took some action itself in response to the public outcry
about violence on television. "5 This method of coercion, however, was
later held unconstitutional, I"6 and, although the FVH remains a part of
the Code of the National Association of Broadcasters,' 7 it has not
110. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970). Television is one form of radio communication. Allen B. Dumont Laboratories, Inc. v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153, 155 (3d Cir. 1950).
111. Statement of Dean Burch, former FCC chairman, quoted in Home Box Office, Inc. v.
FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
112. See, e.g., In re Petition by The Foundation to Improve Television, 25 F.C.C.2d 830
(1970) (seeking FCC promulgation of regulations banning "fictional violence and horror during
all but the late evening hours"); FCC REPORT ON THE BROADCAST OF VIOLENT, INDECENT, AND
OBSCENE MATERIAL, I F.C.C.2d 418, 418-19 (1975) (25,000 complaints about sex and violence on
television sent to the FCC in 1974).
113. See, e.g., In re Complaint of the Polite Soe'y, Inc. Against Station WLS-TV, 55 F.C.C.2d
810, 811 (1975) (complaint denied due to FCC position that it cannot regulate mayhem or violence
on television); FCC EN BANC PROGRAMMING INQUIRY, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2310 (1960) (FCC "concedes that it is precluded from examining a program for taste or content, unless the recognized
exceptions to censorship apply").
114. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("The Commission has struck this balance by requiring licensees to conduct formal surveys to ascertain the need
for certain types of non-entertainment programming, while allowing licensees wide discretion in
the area of entertainment programming."); FCC EN BANC PROGRAMMING INQUIRY, 44 F.C.C.
2303, 2312 (1960) (licensee meets his public responsibility if he engages in "a diligent and continuing effort to discover and fulfill the tastes, needs and desires of his service area"). See generally
Note, supra note 89, at 265-67, 280.
115. See Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1142-43 (C.D. Cal.
1976).
116. Id. at 1155; see text accompanying notes 175-86 infra.
117. The Code provides in part: "Additionally, entertainment programming inappropriate for
viewing by a general family audience should not be broadcast during the first hour of network
entertainment programming in prime time and in the immediately preceding hour." THE TELEVISION CODE OF THE NAT'L ASS'N OF BROADCASTERS, § 1, reprintedinWORKING MANUAL OF THE

NAT'L Ass'N OF BROADCASTERS CODE AUTHORITY (1978). The Code also provides that violence
is not to be used exploitatively, excessively, gratuitously or instructionally. Id. § 4. The consequences to the victim and perpetrator should be shown, and violence is not to be used for its own
sake. Id.
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proved to be an effective means of controlling violence.""
Although the government has done little to regulate television violence, an argument can be made that with sufficient justifications the
FCC can and should interfere directly in program content through the
use of formal procedures rather than informal coercion. Moreover, if
the justifications for direct government interference are not sufficient to
override the first amendment, the government can still act indirectly to
control violence. The FCC could use its licensing power to require certain types of nonviolent programming; it could make suggestions to the
networks for more effective self-regulation without going to the lengths
used in the FVH case; or Congress could act to remove from programnuing the commercialism that many claim causes television violence. 19
In each case, however, it must be decided that the reduction in violence
is worth any resultant infringement of the first amendment. It must
also be decided whether it would be better to attack what many feel is
the basis of the problem, the structure of the broadcast industry itself,
and, if so, what method will best accomplish this goal.
A.

Direct Government Regulation

There are four possible justifications for holding that the FCC can
and should, consistent with the first amendment, interfere, at least to
some extent, in television program content in order to control the
amount of violence on television:
(1) television has a uniquely pervasive presence within
the privacy of the home;
(2) television is uniquely accessible to children;
(3) television has a limited number of available frequencies, thus those available must be operated in the public
interest, and television violence is not in the public interest;
and
(4) television violence is injurious to the public health.
Although the courts have never specifically dealt with these justifications in relation to televised violence, they have dealt with them in
118. See, eg., EARLY WINDOW, supra note 4, at 140-41, 169-70 (failure of the industry to
regulate itself under the NAB CODE). See also, e.g., Sex and Violence on TV, supra note 5, at 64

(1977) (statement of Timothy E. Wirth) (violence continues to appear in the Family Viewing
Hour); VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 25 (dissenting views of Rep. Henry A. Waxman)
('[Elven as the networks were proclaiming family viewing as an effective policy which would have
a positive impact, the level of violence on television remained relatively undiminished.").
119. See generally text accompanying notes 194-96 infra.
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other contexts. The Supreme Court, in FCCv.Pacflca Foundation,t20
relied heavily on the first two of these justifications in upholding the
regulation of "indecent," as opposed to "obscene," speech on a radio
broadcast, thereby creating a new type of speech that is to be given a
lesser degree of first amendment protection.' 2 ' The Court conceded
that the speech in question was merely patently offensive and did not
rise to the level of obscenity by appealing to the prurient interest of
listeners.122 Nonetheless, the Court held that the use of indecent speech
over the airwaves when children were likely to be in the audience involved sufficient potential harm to justify its direct regulation. 123 It can
similarly be argued that the Court should also classify television violence as a type of speech that should be given a lesser degree of first
amendment protection because of its potential for harm. The justifications for so treating television violence, however, are not as strong as
those supporting such action with regard to indecent speech.
The first justification for a similar treatment of television violence
is that television has attained a uniquely pervasive presence within the
privacy of the home. The right to be let alone in the privacy of the
home outweighs the first amendment rights of an intruder in contexts
other than television, and television should be given no greater protection.'2 4 Even though the viewer must take affirmative action to turn on
the set and invite the broadcast into his home, the general tendency is
to turn on the set without knowing what is on or to scan the dial in
search of interesting programming. Even prior warnings may not completely protect the listeners or viewers. Warnings before the show are
insufficient for two reasons: (1) children often control the dial and cannot generally be expected to have the maturity to act in their "best"
interests, and (2) people often tune in after the show has started. As the
court noted in PaeifcaFoundation, "[tjo say that one may avoid further
offense by turning off the radio.

. .

is like saying that the remedy for

120. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
121. The Court in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 114 (1974), held that "indecent" as
used in 18 U.S.C. § 1461 had the same meaning as "obscene" as defined in Miller v. California,

413 U.S. 15 (1973). Now the Court has given "indecent" a broader definition than that given
"obscene." 438 U.S. at 734-41; see id. at 778-80 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
122. 438 U.S. at 739-41; see Id. at 767 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[B]ecause the Carlin monologue is obviously not an erotic appeal to the prurient interests of children," the Court is in effect

preventing children from hearing material constitutionally protected as to them.).
123. 438 U.S. at 749-50; see id. at 759-60 (Powell, J., concurring).
124. 438 U.S. at 748; see Rowan v. United States P.O. Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (sanctuary of the home can be protected from unwanted mailings); Beard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622

(1951) (statute forbidding solicitation of private residence without the consent of the owner upheld).
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an assault is to run away after the first blow."' 25 The FCC, in In re
WUHY-FM, 26 found that the usefulness of radio for millions of people might be drastically curtailed if listeners found themselves faced
with offensive programming across the dial. 27 The same argument can
be made for television. Television and radio have established themselves in the home; to say now that the broadcasters' interests are paramount because they have been invited is unacceptable.
The presence of violence on television, however, does not rise to
the level of "indecent" or "offensive" programming, which was characterized in Pacffca as lacking literary, political or scientific value, and as
being vulgar, shocking and offensive. 2 The FCC has refused to act in
the area of television violence because "[p]ortrayals of mayhem and
violence have never been held to be profane or obscene. . . nor...
indecent." 12 9 Violence in literature has not traditionally been characterized as vulgar, shocking and offensive; it has, on the other hand,
been recognized as having literary value.1 30 One of the characteristics
of offensive speech is that it offends and people would prefer not to be
confronted with it. No present data supports the argument that substantial numbers of viewers have given up television because of the violence.' 3 ' Many argue, in fact, that violence continues on television
because of its popularity,1 32 a popularity that indicates that the presentation of violence is not offensive. Network shows do not survive unless they obtain a substantial rating, and the presentation of violence
33
seems to be a simple and effective way to draw a large audience.
125. 438 U.S. 748-49.
126. 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970).
127. Id. at411-12.
128. 438 U.S. at 746-47.
129. In re Complaint of the Polite Soe'y, Inc. Against Station WLS-TV, 55 F.C.C.2d 810, 813
(1975).
130. See authorities cited note 70 supra.
131. Still, 35% of those surveyed in one poll favored removing all television shows that showed
violence. The Gallup Opinion Index, April 1977, at 18.
132. See, e.g., VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 20-24 (dissenting views of Rep. Henry A.
Waxman); EARLY WINDOW,supra note 4, at 146 ("Present network standards on portrayals of

violence are weak because they appear to be based on little more than a fear of losing viewers."
(quoting TASK FORCE ON MASS MEDIA AND VIOLENCE, 11 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, MASS MEDIA AND VIOLENCE 613 (1969) (staff report)) );
The War Against Television Violence, Bus. & Soc. REV., Fall 1977, at 25, 32 ("The networks are

resisting change because they feel they are giving the public what they want.").
133. See, e.g., E. KAYE, THE FAMILY GUIDE TO CHILDREN'S TELEVISION 66 (1974) ("the only
way to reduce the violence on television would be to take children's programming out of the
ratings system," ie., to remove the commercial incentives); SUROEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra
note 1,at 81 (studies show that proportion of violence on American television is greater than that
of several nations surveyed, thus giving some support to theory that television violence is en-
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Television violence, therefore, cannot be considered an invasion of the

privacy of the home in the way that indecent speech can.
The second justification for government regulation of televised violence is the accessibility of television to children. It is well established
that a state can "adopt more stringent controls on communicative
materials available to youths than on those available to adults."'' 34 But
only "in relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may govern-

ment bar public dissemination of protected materials to [children]."' 35
Although other forms of expression can be withheld from children
without totally restricting the material at its source, this is not so for
television and radio.' 3 6 The "ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast material," coupled with the government's interest in
the well-being of its youth and in supporting parents' claims to authorFoundation to justify
ity in their own household, were held in Pacoca
37
special treatment of indecent broadcasting.
Television violence, however, does not affect parental authority
the way that offensive speech does. Offensive speech teaches children
words to which parents do not want their children subjected. Television violence, on the other hand, can be used to portray literary, philosophical and political ideas. 38 The state does not have the power to
couraged by the American competitive economic system); Note, supra note 6, at 1313 (networks
have no incentive to regulate violence so long as it brings in profits through mass appeal).
134. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975); see, e.g., Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
135. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975); see, e.g., Tinker v. Des
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (right of students to wear black arm bands in protest of
Vietnam war); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968) (statute that prevented
youths from seeing films that describe or portray brutality, violence or sexual promiscuity in a
manner likely to incite young persons to crime, delinquency or sexual promiscuity invalidated);
Rabeck v. New York, 391 U.S. 462 (1968) (per curiam) (invalidated statute prohibiting sale of
"any.. . magazines.. . which would appeal to the lust of persons under the age of eighteen
years or to their curiosity as to sex or to the anatomical differences between the sexes").
136. Although the ban cannot be total, stores can be prevented from selling obscene books to
minors, and minors can be kept out of theatres. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 749.
137. Id. at 749-50; see id. at 757-58 (Powell, J., concurring). Similarly, in Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968), the Court held that those responsible for a child's well-being could
be supported by laws designed to help them discharge their responsibilities. In that case, however,
parents who so desired could purchase the "obscene" magazines for their children. Although the
primary responsibility for a child's welfare remains with the parents, the Court also noted the
state's independent interest in the well-being of its youth. Id.
138. Television violence does not have the cultural stigma of offensive speech; violence is a
part of life, it is a part of history and it is a part of classic literature. See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAi's REPORT, supra note 1, at 45-46 (quoting from Report of the National Commission on the
Causes and Prevention of Violence), 190; TVon TrialAgain, NEwsWEEK, August 14, 1978, at 41.
Although some of these statements could be made for offensive speech, offensive speech does not
have the "constructive" aspect that violence does. Offensive speech has always existed, but it has
not been an integral part of history or of life, as violence has. One can talk of life or history
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protect children from ideas, no matter how offensive they may be to
some people, 39 and violent portrayals have always been one method of

communication. The adverse impact of violence can be negated by the
parent if he talks to the child and gives -him the proper values. 14 0
Moreover, offensive speech is more likely to recur later in spite of pa-

rental admonitions.
The third justification for limiting television violence-that the
limited number of available frequencies requires that the industry be
regulated in the public interest-is insufficient to support qualifying the
first amendment protection given to television violence. The "public
interest, convenience and necessity""14 standard has by necessity been

used in rulings relating to specific program content-for example, in
choosing between competing license applicants.' 42 The United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v. FCC, 143 held the FCC must regulate programming when a significant segment of the public is threatened with losing

a preferred category of programming. As stated in Banzhaf v. Federal
Communications Commission,'" however,
[T]here is high risk that such rulings will reflect the Commission's
selection among tastes, opinions, and value judgments, rather than a
recognizable public interest. Especially with First Amendment issues
lurking in the near background, the "public interest" is too vague a
criterion for administrative action unless it is narrowed by definable

standards. 145

In upholding an FCC ruling that stations carrying cigarette ads
must "devote a significant amount of broadcast time to presenting the
case against cigarette smoking," Banzhaf used the relatively well-defined public health standard to remove the vagueness and overbreadth
without reference to offensive speech; it would be difficult to do so without reference to violence.
Finally, offensive speech is not a part of classic literature. See authorities cited note 70 supra.
139. See authorities cited note 135 supra. See also Note, supra note 47, at 984 (1977) (fact that
adoption of FVH to protect children does not remove problems of vagueness and overbreadth).
140. See, e.g., VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 10-11.
141. 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1976); see, eg., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101
(1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1969); FCC v. Pottsville Broad-

casting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1940).
142. See, e.g., NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-17 (1943); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d
1082, 1093-94 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The Federal Radio Commission originally established the policy
of considering program content in a license renewal proceeding. See, e.g., Trinity Methodist
Church, South v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932); KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F.2d
670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
143. 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
144. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
145. Id. at 1096.
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attendant in using the "public interest" standard. 146 The court used the
public health standard because of its long history, fairly clear definition
and obvious applicability to the case at hand.'47 The court listed four
criteria that supported content regulation in the interest of public
health: (1) there was an element of danger to life itself; (2) the danger
was inherent in the product in normal use; (3) the danger threatened a
substantial body of people; and (4) the danger8 was documented by a
compelling cumulation of statistical evidence.14
49
These four criteria, however, are not met by televised violence. 1
The effect of violence is dependent on a myriad of intervening variables 5 ° and does not increase the likelihood of death for viewers because of their use of television. Nor is the danger inherent in normal
use because television does not affect all who use it; the danger is rather
that someone will use what he has seen against another. 15 Further, the
danger does not threaten a substantial number of people since television violence affects only some people to some extent some of the time,
and their actions against others involve even a smaller number of people. 52 Finally, the conclusions of the studies completed at this time
do
53
not amount to a compelling cumulation of statistical evidence.'
Even if it could be shown that televised violence does have an adverse effect on the public health, the warning expressed by the Banzhaf
court would have to be considered.
[W]e are not prepared to say that the Commission is authorized to
condemn every broadcast which might, without arbitrariness or caprice, be thought to pose some danger to the public health .... [In
some cases what is concededly optimal health may4 be a less important public value than other conflicting interests.'S
That warning is well taken in the area of televised violence. The danger to life itself is the closest criterion that applies to television violence.
146. Id. at 1096-97. See also KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
147. 405 F.2d at 1096-97.
148. Id. at 1097.
149. But see Sweeney, Regulation of Television Program Content by the FederalCommunica.
tions Commission, 8 U. RICH. L. REV. 233, 242 (1974); Note, The FCCas Fairy Godmother-Improving Children's Television, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv., 1290, 1300-02 (1974).
150. See text accompanying notes 36-40 supra.
151. Cigarettes directly adversely affect the physical health of all users. Television causes
some viewers to behave in socially disapproved ways. The differing implications for public health
are obvious.
152. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
153. The evidence against television violence simply does not rise to the level of the evidence
against smoking. Compare the evidence against smoking presented at 405 F.2d at 1097-98 with
that against television violence, see text at notes 94-97 supra.
154. 405 F.2d at 1097.
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The danger, however, occurs only in some circumstances from some

people imitating what they see or being desensitized, with the result
that others are harmed. This is not a direct and substantial danger to
life caused by television alone, and this threat does not outweigh the
right to first amendment protection.

Even if all four of these justifications for regulating television are
considered cumulatively, they do not justify limiting the first amendment protection given to television violence. The problems of government censorship outweigh the harm that television violence has been
shown to cause. The FCC has properly acknowledged that "provocative programming. . . may offend some listeners. But this does not

mean that those offended have the right, through the Commission's licensing power, to rule such programming off the airwaves."1 55 Because
"[g]overnment censorship would be the most pervasive, the most selfserving, the most difficult to restrain and hence the one most to be

avoided,"'156 it is only when public interests outweigh private journalistic interests that government power should be asserted. That point has

not been reached with televised violence.' 57
B.

Indirect Government Actions

Some commentators have suggested indirect government action
(government involvement in areas other than control of violence in
program content) rather than direct government regulation as a means

of reducing violence on television while avoiding first amendment
problems.' 51 Possible methods of indirect control include removing

commercialism from programming, suggesting self-regulation to the
155. In re Pacifica Foundation, FCC 64-43, No. 45386 at 3-5, quoted in Writers Guild of
America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1148-49 (C.D. Cal. 1976). The FCC has acknowledged that it cannot force a licensee to discontinue program material because it offends some or
even a substantial percentage of the audience. Id.
156. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 105 (1973). "Government rules could
create the risk of improper governmental interference in sensitive, subjective decisions about programming, could tend to freeze present standards and could also discourage creative developments in the medium." FCC REPORT ON THE BROADCAST OF VIOLENT, INDECENT, AND OBSCENE
MATERIAL, 51 F.C.C.2d 418, 420 (1975). But see Sweeney, Regulation of Television Program Content by the FederalCommunications Commission, 8 U. RICH. L. REV. 233 (1974).
157. This argument holds even against "time, place and manner" regulations. The Court in
Pac#FcaFoundationnoted the importance of the time of broadcast in regulating indecent speech.
438 U.S. at 750. But television violence is not equivalent to indecent speech. See text accompanying notes 79-83 supra. The adverse effects of government control of program content pose too
much of a threat to socially desirable speech in the area of television violence to be justified for
any time period unless a much stronger relation between television violence and harm to society
can be shown. See generally text accompanying notes 79-97 supra.
158. See, e.g., VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 13-14.
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networks and using the licensing process to require certain categories of
programming in the public interest. Suggestions for implementing the
last option include the following:
(1) The FCC could develop rules requiring certain
types of programming in the public interest, such as public
affairs and family shows, and it could enforce these rules
through the licensing process. 59
(2) The FCC could require the networks to alternate in
presenting at least one children's show every night from seven
to nine.

160

(3) The FCC could create a noncommercial network,
such as a network that produced only children's shows, and
give that network certain hours in which to broadcast over
frequencies now allocated to affiliates of the major networks,' 6 ' thereby supplementing the activities of the current
noncommercial Public Broadcasting Service.
Each of these three options would provide the viewer with more nonviolent programming, thereby defusing the impact of the violent shows.
It has long been acknowledged that the FCC can interest itself in
program content in the licensing process. License renewal applications
must set forth the amount or percentage of time devoted to categories
of programs, such as religious, educational and agricultural. 62 In
1974, the FCC added programming for children to this listing, holding
that the public interest required such programming. 63 Because of first
amendment considerations and a desire to "avoid detailed governmental supervision of programming whenever possible," however, no requirements have ever been made concerning the percentage of time
that should be devoted to any category. 64
Strong arguments can be made that the FCC has the power to implement any of these suggestions in applying the public interest stan159. See generally VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 24-25 (dissenting views of Rep. Henry
A. Waxman); Comment, The FCC as Fairy Godmother. Improving Children's Television, 21
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1290, 1305-06 (1974).
160. See Sex and Violence on TV, supra note 5, at 148 (statement of Geoffrey Cowan).
161. See generally VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 13-14; Sex and Violence on TV, supra
note 5, at 148 (statement of Geoffrey Cowan); see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395

U.S. 367, 389 (1969) ("There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government
from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others .... ").
162. See CHILDREN'S TELEVISION REPORT AND POLICY STATEMENT, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 4 (1974).
163. Id. at 6.
164.

Id. at 4, 6.
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dard pursuant to its licensing powers since each suggestion adds to the
public interest by increasing diversity in programming. 65 The
problems associated with these suggestions, however, should deter their
implementation as long as any other method of dealing with the problem of television violence remains. The foremost problem associated
with these suggestions is that of government intervention in entertainment decisionmaking. Harold Mendelsohn 6 6 sarcastically expressed
the basic philosophical problems inherent in such government control:
"Because audiences are viewed basically as automation receptacles incompetent to make meaningful judgments in their own behalf, it is recommended that external standards be set by various regulatory elitist
bodies outside the domains of audiences."' 67 Allowing an independent
government agency almost complete discretion to determine what is in
the public interest, what violence is acceptable, and at what time,
would seriously threaten first amendment freedom. Further, even
though these proposals might control violence for a few hours on a few
remain in the
stations, the incentives for violent programming would
168
stations.
uncontrolled
the
on
and
times
uncontrolled
The second option, that of having the FCC suggest self-regulation,
has a greater potential for producing less overall violence in all time
slots, but it too infringes upon first amendment rights. The FCC, despite its denials to the contrary,169 can bring about substantial changes
in programming simply by suggesting to the industry that changes are
needed and by threatening government action rather than by promulgating direct and formal regulations. 70 One notice of apparent liabil165. "In the absence of carefully defined categories of speech falling outside First Amendment
protections, FCC regulation of program content has been permitted only insofar as it has served to
promote greater diversity in the broadcasting medium." Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v.
FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
166. Mr. Mendelsohn serves on the faculty of the Department of Communications of Denver
University.
167. Sex and Violence on TV, supra note 5, at 14 (testimony of Harold Mendelsohn).
168. See, e.g., VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 25 (dissenting views of Rep. Henry A.
Waxman) (FVH did not stop violence after 9:00 p.m. and did not work in other time zones);
McCALL'S, August 1976, at 33 (FVH has led to an increase in violence on afternoons and weekends). The problems of different time zones cannot be ignored. The FVH ordinarily ended at
9:00 p.m. in New York and Los Angeles, at 8:00 p.m. in the midwest, and at 7:00 p.m. in the
mountain time zone. FCC REPORT ON THE BROADCAST OF VIOLENT, INDECENT, AND OBSCENE
MATERIAL, 51 F.C.C.2d 412, 423 (1975).
169. See generally Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1074
(C.D. Cal. 1976); In re Sonderling Broadcasting Corp. 41 F.C.C.2d 777, 783-84 (1973).
170. See, e.g., Illinois Citizens for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 414-23 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(Bazelon, J., on granting rehearing en banc); Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594, 603-06
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J.,on granting rehearing en banc).
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ity and forfeiture,' 7 ' for instance, marked the end of all "topless" radio
shows, 7 2 although the FCC characterized their universal death as independent station choice. 173 This possibility of "self-regulation" by the
television industry under direct FCC coercion must be considered a
viable type of indirect regulation. 74
The FCC used its power of threatened government action to coerce the television networks into adopting the FVH in 1974. 7 Although this method of coercion was held to be unconstitutional in
Writers GuildofAmerica, West v. FCC, 1 76 the court did not preclude all
77
future suggestions by the FCC about proper industry self-regulation. 1
The evidence clearly showed that in forcing adoption of the FVH the
FCC used informal coercion, not its formal rulemaking and enforcement authority. 78 The court found that the FCC deliberately set out to
suppress and succeeded in suppressing material it considered objectionable 179 without establishing a record to support its action. This action
violated both the Administrative Procedure Act' 80 and the first amendment, making the FVH unenforceable.1 8'
The history of the FVH as enforced by the networks demonstrates
all of the problems of industry self-regulation. The only provision for
enforcement is loss of authorization to display the Seal of Good Practice of the National Association of Broadcasters, which, besides being
171. Simply put, a notice of apparent liability and forfeiture is a fine mechanism. The decision can also be used against the station when its license comes up for renewal. In re Sonderling
Broadcasting Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 777, 777-78 (1973).

172. A "topless" radio show is the trade term for a call-in show in which the master of ceremo.
nies discusses intimate sexual topics with his listeners, who are usually women. In re Sonderling

Broadcasting Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 777, 778-79 (1973).
173. See id. at 783-84.

174. Past performance by the industry shows that the possibility of self-regulation without
government pressure is negligible. See, e.g., EARLY WINDOW, supra note 4, at 170 (quoting Congressman John Murphy: "In the face of an 18 year history of failure at self-control, Ifeel it is safe
to conclude that we cannot depend on the TV industry to clean its own house of TV violence.");
VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 11-12 ("The subcommittee.., is concerned with the results
to date of the industry's efforts to regulate itself.").
175. See Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1142 (C.D. Cal.

1976).
176. 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
177. Id. at 1073. The court noted that the FCC can still make suggestions to broadcasters; it

simply cannot threaten regulatory action to back up those suggestions. Id. at 1150. Thus some
form of "raised eyebrows" can be used, although not quite so blatantly. See generally Note, supra

note 47, at 971-73.
178. 423 F. Supp. at 1142, 1149, 1151-52.
179. Id. at 1142.

180. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
181. 423 F. Supp. at 1151-52.
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of doubtful coercive effect, has almost never been utilized."8 2 Violence

has not disappeared from the family hour,8 3 let alone from the rest of
the time slots. I8 4 The industry has consistently promised that it would
act to reduce violence, 8 5 but only direct government threats have
forced the networks into action, and even that action has had little impact.

The underlying problem in self-regulation appears to be the structure of the television industry. Local programming accounts for only
15-20% of all programming, and most of that is composed of news
shows.' 8 6 There are only three major purchasers and outlets of programs (ABC, CBS, and NBC), and their competition is directed solely

to obtaining mass audiences.' 87 Many argue that this causes them to
produce for the lowest common denominator, avoiding alternatives
and innovation in fear that they will not attract enough viewers.'
"The questions of what the needs of the community are at particular

times" may be "peculiarly the province of the licensee," 18 9 but he has
little choice in what to show.
Some suggest that, because of this domination of the networks, in

order to increase the effectiveness of self-regulation of the television
industry it is necessary to give the local affiliates more independence

from the networks. 9 ' For instance, local stations have traditionally
been given minimal time to pre-screen programs before broadcasting
them.' 9 ' If the FCC required that this time span be extended, the local

stations would be in a better position to switch to other shows and re182.

NATIONAL ASS'N OF BROADCASTERS CODE AUTHORITY, BROADCAST SELF-REGULATION

WORKING MANUAL; EARLY WINDOW, supra note 4, at 140.

183. See, e.g., Sex and Violence on TV,supra note 5, at 4 (statement of Timothy Wirth) ("The
violence index did not come down after the first season of family viewing. In fact, violence in
children's programs showed a sharp increase over 1974."); VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 5
n.25 (28 violent incidents per week during FVH on three networks during 1976-77).
184. See, e.g., TVs FamilyHour One Year Later, MCCALL'S, August 1976, at 33.
185. See, e.g., VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 11-12.
186. See VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 8-9. See also Mt.Mansfield Television, Inc. v.
FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 482-83 (2d Cir. 1971) ("access to network affiliated stations during prime time
is virtually impossible for independent producers of syndicated programs").
187. See VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 23 (dissenting views of Rep. Henry A. Waxman).
188. See, ag., id.
189. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1134 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
190. See, e.g., VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 8-10. The FCC has consistently acted to
limit network domination of the television industry. For instance, the FCC has promulgated the
Chain Broadcasting Rules, FCC Order of May 2, 1941, Docket No. 5060, as amended by FCC
Order of Oct. 11, 1941, and the Prime Time Access Rules, 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1977). See
generally Note, FederalRegulation of Television Broadcasting--Are the Prime Time Access Rules
and the Family Viewing Hour in the Public Interest?, 29 RUTGER L. REv. 902 (1976).
191. See, ag., VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 9.
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ject violent programs.' 92 This argument, however, is premised on the
idea that the local stations are more likely to exercise self-regulation
than are the networks-a premise that has not been proved. Both
levels of the industry are profit-motivated, and violence has been
shown to produce profits. Thus it has been suggested that "as long as
broadcasters believed that violent programs were the easiest way to get
large audiences, the highest share of the ratings, and thus the most advertising dollars, they would continue to schedule violence for children."' 93 On the basis of the failure of the FVH, the past performance
by the industry and the structure of the industry itself, there seems to be
little hope that coercion by the FCC will lead to more stringent selfregulation.
Another method of attacking this underlying problem of the structure of the industry is for Congress to act to remove the commercial
incentive from television programming by passing legislation changing
the nature of television sponsoring. Two options for changing the
financial structure of television programming are worth mentioning:
(1) to have advertisers pay into a fund for all programming, with their
ads being revolved through the total weeks' programming; and (2) to
have the viewers finance the programming. 94 Either of these suggestions should eliminate the need to use violence to obtain viewers in
order to obtain advertising dollars.
The first suggestion would mark a radical departure from the
American tradition of letting advertisers and those seeking ads work
out their own arrangements. It is also questionable how much money
advertisers would be willing to put into this type of system, in which
they would not know when or on what type show their ads would appear. With program costs rising steadily, this might lead to worse,
rather than better, programming, 195 as more violence is used over the
entire spectrum in an attempt to draw larger audiences continuously
and thus more advertising dollars.
Having viewers finance programming conflicts with the well-established cost-free status of American television. 196 Moreover, since cable
192. See, e.g., Id.

193. E. KAYE, supra note 133, at 66; see, e.g., EARLY WINDOW, supra note 4, at 162-65 (alternatives to commercialism).
194. See generally EARLY WINDOW, spranote 4, at 164.
195. See generally Comment, The FCC as Fairy Godmother: Improving Children'r Television,
21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1290, 1316-17 (1974).

196. Free television has not always been so well established. Advertiser-financed programs
were first introduced systematically by AT & T in 1922, and were met with "widespread indigna-
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television already offers a diversity to those wishing to pay for it, the
second option of having viewers pay for programming is already being
introduced. Therefore, a procedure as radical as the decommercializa-

tion of television should be considered only if no other option is available to defuse the impact of television violence.
III.

DEREGULATION-RELIANCE ON PUBLIC ACTIVISM AND
COMPETITION TO DEFUSE THE IMPACT OF TELEVISION
"VIOLENCE

The most attractive option to control violence on television is to

follow the principles of the proposed Communications Act of 1978197

and rely on competition in the marketplace and a vocal public to
defuse the impact of violence on television. Because of the technologi-

cal advances made in the broadcast field, a fully competitive system
could offer enough options to the viewer that he would not be faced

with a predominance of violence wherever he turned. This would in
theory reduce the impact of television violence. As the alternatives to

violent programming are developed, the outcry against television violence should subside, just as past public demands for government regulation of violence in other forms of media have with time subsided.
Until unfettered competition has been given a chance to produce this
result, however, public activism, rather than government regulation,
should be relied upon to control the networks. Although public activ-

ism does, to some degree, infringe freedom of expression,' 98 the evils in
its use are far less than those involved in government regulation, 199 and
the success that it has achieved demonstrates that it is a viable option.
tion." National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, 201 & n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The
FCC has traditionally realized that ads are necessary for broadcasting to exist, but has confined
them "so as to preserve the largest possible amount of services for the public." CHILDREN'S TELEVISION REPORT AND POLICY STATEMENT, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 9 (1974).
197. H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
198. See, e.g., note 232 infra.
199. The evils inherent in government regulation are obvious, and include a suppression of
full and unfettered speech, a desire to preserve the status quo, and a tendency to promote government interests to the exclusion of other interests. See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 105 (1973) (between private and official censorship, "[glovernment censorship would be
the most pervasive, the most self-serving, the most difficult to restrain and hence the one most to

be avoided"); FCC REPORT

ON THE BROADCAST OF VIOLENT, INDECENT AND OBSCENE MATE-

RIAL,51 F.C.C.2d 418, 420 (1975) ("g]overnment rules could create the risk of improper governmental interference in sensitive, subjective decisions about programming, could tend to freeze
present standards and could also discourage creative developments in the medium").
Thomas Jefferson, in reference to the "malignity, the vulgarity, and mendacious spirit of
is an evil, however, for which there is no remedy,
those who write" the newspapers, said that "[ilt
our liberty depends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited without being lost." T.
JEFFERSON, DEMOCRACY 150-51 (Padover ed. 1939), quoted in 412 U.S. 94, 153 (1973) (Douglas,
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Even if competition does not totally eliminate the problem, moreover,
public activism ought to be preferred over the more dubious option of
government interference.
Just as the public is now clamoring for the regulation of television
violence so it has clamored for the regulation of each media form at
one time or another. 2" "For over 100 years, individuals, citizens
groups, and Congress have questioned the role of literature and the
mass media in creating a climate which may lead to violent behavior in
society." '0 1 The concern in the 1930s, for instance, revolved around the
interaction between children and horror movies.20 2 In the 1950s, pressures centered around comic books and the assertion that they were
teaching children that violence is a constructive, socially approved
form of settling difficulties.20 3 In each case, however, with time the
clamor subsided without undue infringement on the first amendment
and apparently without undue adverse affects on children. 2 4 It thereJ., concurring). Although Jefferson was not referring to violence in the media, the principle is the
same. If the government controls program content, there is no one to control the government.
200. The courts have consistently noted that different media are entitled to different amounts
of first amendment protection. See, e.g., Southwestern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,
557-58 (1975) (live drama); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-02 (1973) (broadcasting); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (broadcasting); Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1952) (motion pictures). In Burstyn, the Court
noted that the argument that motion pictures pose a greater capacity for evil, particularly among
youngsters, than other modes of expression may be "relevant in determining the permissible scope
of community control." Id. at 502. See generally Winick, Censor andSensibility4 Content,4naysis of the Television Censor's Comments, in VIOLENCE AND THE MASS MEDIA 252, 255 (0. Larsen
ed. 1968) (comparison of radio, television and movie codes).
201. VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.Laws prohibiting the distribution of magazines
primarily devoted to crime and horror stories began appearing in the 1880s. Eg., Law of May 28,
1884, ch. 380, 1884 N.Y. Laws 464; Law of Apr. 13, 1886, ch. 177, § 4, 1886 Iowa Laws 217; Law
of Mar. 6, 1885, ch. 348, 1885 Maine Laws 291; Law of May 28, 1884, ch. 380, 1884 N.Y. Laws
464. See also Law of Apr. 29, 1955, ch. 836, § 541, 1955 N.Y. Laws 1988 (misdemeanor to sell a
comic book with a title containing the words "crime, sex, horror or terror or the content of which
is devoted to or principally made up of pictures or accounts of methods of crime, of illicit sex,
horror, terror, physical torture, brutality or physical violence").
202. See, e.g., M. HELLER & S. POLSKY, STUDIES IN VIOLENCE 2 (1976).
203. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 1ST SESs., REPORT ON COMIC
BOOKS AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (Comm. Print 1955).
[T]his country cannot afford the calculated risk involved in feeding its children, through
comic books, a concentrated diet of crime, horror, and violence. There was substantial,
although not unanimous, agreement among the experts that there may be detrimental
and delinquency-producing effects upon both the emotionally disturbed child and the
emotionally normal delinquent. Children of either type may gain suggestion, support,
and sanction from reading crime and horror comics.
Id. at 32. Yet the Committee flatly rejected the idea of government censorship, relying instead on
self-regulation. Id. at 23. See generally Larsen, ControversiesAbout the Mass Communication of
Polence, in VIOLENCE AND THE MASS MEDIA, supra note 201, at 21-23; Twomey, New Forms of
Social Control over Mass Media Content, in VIOLENCE AND THE MASS MEDIA, supra note 201, at
176-77.
204. The debate over comic books in the 1950s, for instance, showed a marked similarity to
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fore appears that letting television develop, as these other forms have
developed, could lead to an acceptable result without government censorship.
The degree to which innovations have broadened the communications spectrum 5 and the degree to which these innovations have been
accepted support the conclusion that, if given the time and the freedom
to develop, these innovations will dissipate the impact of television violence. 20 6 Cable television, for instance, currently offers over thirty-five
channels, with a potential for handling at least eighty,2 7 and has grown
the present public outcry with respect to television. Yet little is heard today. Frederick Wertham,
who now denounces television violence, formerly argued that comics had to be controlled because
they taught children that violence is a constructive, socially approved form of settling difficulties.
Larsen, ControversiesAbout the Mass Communication of Violence, in VIOLENCE AND THE MASS
MEDIA, supra note 201, at 22-23.
The result of this crusade against comic books was the establishment of a Code for the
Comics Magazine Association of America and a Code Administrator who pre-screened all comics
and gave them a stamp of approval if they did not, for instance, use scenes of excessive violence or
present the unique details and methods of a crime. Larsen, Controversies.4boutthe Mass Communication of Violence, in VIOLENCE AND THE MASS MEDIA, supra note 201, at 21. The only coercion was supplied by the public, however, and only if the public refused to buy unapproved
comics would the comic producers feel compelled to seek approval. Address by the Code Administrator, Comics Magazine Ass'n of America to the Annual Meeting of the Association of Towns
of the State of New York (Feb. 9, 1956), reprintedin VIOLENCE AND THE MASS MEDIA, supranote
201, at 244.
The current relaxation of public clamor against comics (or replacement by clamor against
television) is demonstrated by the number of horror comics now being sold and by the violence in
many comics. For an example of the changing mores with respect to comics, compare the cover
that practically initiated a Congressional hearing in the 1950s, depicted in VIOLENCE AND THE
MASS MEDIA, supra note 201, at 215 (man with ax holding woman's head with blood dripping in
foreground, decapitated body in background) with the Nov. 1978 The Savage Sword of Conan the
Barbarian (man with sword dripping blood holding man's head dripping with blood in foreground, decapitated body and terrified woman in background).
205. See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 4 ("New developments-UHF,
public television, cable, cassettes, portable minisets-suggest that in the future the programming
available may become increasingly varied and that the mass audience may become a diversity of
smaller segments, each with its special interests. Newspapers, magazines, and radio provide examples of similar evolution."); Television Broadcast Policies, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Communications ofthe Senate Comm. on Commerce Science and Transportation,95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 54-64 (Comm. Print 1977) (statement of Glen Robinson); White, *hat Can ParentsDo About
Unsavory TVShows?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, June 19, 1978, at 83 ("videocassettes, videodiscs, pay TV, cable TV, pay cable and satellite distribution systems. . . threaten to make obsolete the local broadcaster whose outlook is limited to ratings").
206. The recent decision by Warner Cable to use satellite broadcasting to offer thirteen hours
a day of nonviolent children's programming to local systems illustrates this potential to dampen
the impact of any remaining violence through offering nonviolent alternatives. See Wicklein,
Wired City, U.S.A., THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, February 1979, at 35, 38.
207. Note, CommunicationsLaw-FCCLacks Authority to PromulgateRules Controlling Content oCablecastsProgrammingUnless Such RegulationsPromote ObjectivesPreviously Held Valid
in the Regulation oBroadcastProgramming,27 CATH. U.L. REv. 432, 432 n.2 (1978). See generally Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
In Columbus, Ohio, for instance, cable television offers ten regular and public-broadcast
channels, ten community channels and ten "premium" channels (which include educational and
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from 70 systems and 14,000 subscribers in 1952 to 3,801 systems and

11,900,000 subscribers in 1977.20 Because cable television is funded by
subscriptions, there is no need to try to gain a large share of the audience for any single show, nor is there any need for individual shows to
compete. Thus, there is no inducement to use violence on shows just to
draw an audience. More channels plus lower costs of transmission
make it possible for a wide spectrum of interests to broadcast, regardthe audience, again providing alternatives to violent
less of the size of
20 9
programming.

This method of defusing the impact of television violence through
creating as wide a diversity as possible in the available forums, rather
than through controlling the content of speech, conflicts less with the
first amendment than any other method of controlling violence on television. This fundamental belief in the advantages of a diversity of
viewpoints underscored the original Communications Act,210 in which
entertainment channels). It also offers a two-way system that allows viewers to vote yes or no or
make multiple selections immediately with regard to what they see on TV. In one instance, during
a blizzard the mayor appeared on television and asked whether he should seek higher assessments
to clean the streets sooner. The viewers immediately pushed their buttons and answered no. Thirteen thousand households in Columbus presently subscribe for a flat rate of $10.95 per month.
See Wicklein, supra note 206, at 35-42.
208. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9,22 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also Banzhafv. FCC,
405 F.2d 1082, 1099-1100 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("It may well be that some venerable FCC policies
cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny in the light of contemporary understanding of the First
Amendment and the modem proliferation of broadcasting outlets."). Although it may be argued
that despite this increase in the number of outlets, control of television remains more restricted
than other media forms, it can also be argued that, in practical terms, the forum of newspapers
and magazines are available to only a select few. Few people "have the folly to think [they] could
combat the New York Times or Denver Post by building a new plant and becoming a competitor." CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 159 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). This
adds even more support to the argument that little weight should be given to the limited number
of television frequencies. Cf. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(considering the number of potential cable television operations, "there is nothing in the record
before us to suggest a constitutional distinction between cable television and newspapers"). But
e Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 ("Unlike broadcasting, the written press includes a rich
variety of outlets for expression. . . which are available to those without technical skills or deep
pockets.").
209. There are, however, potential problems with deregulation. It can be argued that without
government control, the airwaves will be flooded with obscenity and other objectionable materials. Criminal liability would still remain for fraud in broadcasting under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970),
however, as it would for the broadcast of "obscene, indecent, or profane language" under 18
U.S.C. § 1464 (1970). Further, the viewer still has the very real power to discontinue the service,
and with at least some systems premium channels are controlled by a key that presumably can be
kept away from children. See Wicklein, supra note 206, at 35, 36.
Another potential argument is that this growth of alternatives will mean the end of free television. This, however, does not seem to be the case. No evidence has been produced to show that
cable and broadcast television, for instance, cannot profit side by side, or that cable siphons shows
away from broadcast television. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 24, 33, 37, 40
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (no evidence of harm to poor, siphoning or loss of broadcast services).
210. Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162; see text accompanying notes 98-103 supra.
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individual
station licensees were given the ultimate choice of programring211 and monopolistic power was viewed as the enemy.21 2 The reasoning behind that fear of monopoly applies to governmental as well as
private power: both inhibit the free exchange of ideas, and both limit
the potential for innovation and diversity. As the courts have long
held, it is the first amendment right of the audience "to receive suitable
access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas" that is paramount, and that right may not be abridged by either the government or
the broadcasters.213 Thus, although government interference with that
right in the area of television violence could lead to a substantial reduction in violence on television, the cure may prove worse than the disease.
The obvious answer to this fear of monopolistic (or the present
oligopolistic) power is to foster unfettered competition; not only would
this advance the principles of the first amendment, but it should also
reduce the impact of televised violence. This conclusion underlies the
proposal introduced by Congressman Lionel Van Deerlin to replace
the Communications Act of 1934 with the Communications Act of
1978.214 This bill is the product of twenty months of hearings and research and completely revises the former Act, which Congressman Van
Deerlin deemed "as outmoded as the horse-and-buggy." 215 The Subcommittee on Communications of the House Commerce Committee is
seeking House passage in 1979 and Senate passage before the end of
the Ninety-Sixth Congress.2 16
The major innovation of this bill is that it provides for federal regulation of telecommunications only "to the extent marketplace forces
are deficient." '17 The "public interest" standard is no longer to apply,
211. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
212. See, e.g., FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940); Writers Guild of
America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 1976). "We can not allow any
single person or group to place themselves in [a] position where they can censor the material
which shall be broadcasted to the public, nor do I believe that the Government should ever be
placed in the position of censoring this material." HearingsBefore the House Committee on the
Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1924) (testimony of Herbert Hoover, then
Secretary of Commerce, on H.R. 7357), reprintedinCBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
104 (1973).
213. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
214. H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); see 124 CONG. REC. H5231 (daily ed. June 8,
1978) (remarks of Rep. Van Deerlin).
215. 24 CONG. REC. H5231 (daily ed. June 8, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Van Deerlin).
216. Id.; 36 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1547 (1978).

217. Proposed Communications Act of 1978, H.R. 13015, § 101. As expressed by Congressman Van Deerlin: "Where possible, we're going to be trying to get the federal government out of
the business of regulation." 36 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1547 (1978).
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and only the technical requirements of television, such as frequency
assignment, are to be subjected to regulation.218 Because technological
innovations have broadened the communications spectrum, it is
thought that free competition can better serve the public needs than can
federal regulation in the "public interest, ' 2 1 9 and the wider range of

offerings will also theoretically defuse the impact of televised violence.
This theory of protection from excessive television violence
through diversity rests, of course, on the assumption underlying the
proposed Communications Act that the requisite innovations needed to
broaden the spectrum are currently available on a large enough scale22to0
have an impact on the broadcasts available to the viewing public.

The Act restricts total ownership by the same individual to five radio and five television
stations, provides that no individual may own more than three television stations in the top fifty
market, and restricts ownership of broadcast stations to one per market. Proposed Communications Act of 1978, H.R. 13015, supra. Under present law, an individual may hold up to twenty-one
stations-seven TV (no more than five of which can be VHF), seven AM radio, and seven FM
radio.
The FCC has long tried to increase competitive forces. See, e.g., NBC v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 218 (1943) (upholding Chain Broadcasting Regulations promulgated by FCC to increase
free competition in order to encourage "the larger and more effective use of radio in the public
interest"); Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 483 (2d Cir. 1971) (upholding
Prime Time Access Rules as a reasonable attempt to diversify programming by controlling network domination of prime time shows which made access "to network affiliated stations during
prime time.. . virtually impossible for independent producers of syndicated programs").
218. Proposed Communications Act of 1978, H.R. 13015, § 417. Licenses for radio stations
are to be for indefinite duration, while those for television stations are initially for five years,
followed by a five-year renewal and then an indefinite renewal. Id. § 431. License fees are set
according to the value of the spectrum, considering, for instance, the number of frequencies assigned to the market and the number of prime time TV households in such market. Id. § 413.
The Telecommunications Fund receives a percentage of the licensing fees. This fund will be used
to support the Regulatory Commission and to support new programs to aid public interest programming, as well as to encourage minority ownership and the development of services in rural
areas. Id. Selections for new allocations are to be made by random lottery among the acceptable
candidates. Id. § 414. The fairness doctrine and equal access rules are modified into an equity
principle for television. Id. §§ 434,439. Cable TV is completely deregulated. CONG. REC. H5231
(daily ed. June 8, 1978) (highlights of proposed Communications Act of 1978). Finally, a Public
Television Programming Endowment is established to further public broadcasting, Proposed
Communications Act of 1978, H.R. 13015, § 611, and the FCC is replaced by the Communications
Regulatory Commission, id. § 211.
219. Section 101 of the proposed Act specifically finds that regulation is needed only "to the
extent marketplace forces are deficient." The Act does not mention the "public interest." See
authorities cited note 200 supra for a discussion of technical innovations. The cable industry has
subsequently asked for some form of federal protection so that it will not be inundated with fifty
different sets of state regulations. See Wicklein, supra note 206, at 41.
220. In the report of the Subcommittee on Communications on Television Violence in 1977,
the majority, including Chairman Van Deerlin, who introduced the 1978 Act, concluded as follows:
[Tin the extent that current problems are a function of the limited number of communications outlets now available, it is likely that the growth of new technologies will bring
about a more long-term solution. . . .In an environment of programming abundance,
we may find that violent content represents only a small fraction of the total material
available, and its impact may diminish accordingly.
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Although the technology may exist, 22 1 however, these innovations may
not be sufficiently pervasive for some time to come. 222 Furthermore,

even if they do spread to the extent necessary, the thesis that a profusion of frequencies will promote healthful diversity may simply be untrue.2 23 In neither event, however, does it appear that government
regulation is the necessary alternative; rather, the proper agent to control the content of the airwaves is the public.224 For although the FCC
in theory speaks for the people, this is not always the case in practice. 225
A vocal public is in truth the best protector of its own interests.
Recent examples show that a number of methods are available for
citizens to make themselves heard with respect to television violence.
They can write their local stations, the networks, the sponsors, the
FCC, the press or their congressmen. Campaigns against violence by
groups such as the American Medical Association and the Parent
Teachers Association have led to a reduction in the number of violent
shows on television.2 26 Public threats to boycott sponsors' products
have caused many sponsors to become more watchful over the violent
VIOLENCE REPORT, suvra note 8, at 14. Congressman Van Deerlin obviously incorporated this
belief--that the technology will develop if regulatory barriers are removed-into the proposed
1978 Act.
221. Cable television, for instance, is a reality, as is satellite broadcasting, whereby a single
local station can practically become a fourth network by beaming its shows to existing cable systems around the country. See NEWSWEEK, January 1, 1979, at 61.
222. Although the growth of cable, for instance, has been phenomenal, the monthly service
charge may stop its growth after it reaches a certain point, and financing may not be sufficient to
pay for a wide range of viewing options. Atlanta-based WTCG, for example, is considering a 24
hour a day news service channel for its cable customers, but to obtain enough advertising dollars it
would have to double the number of cable subscribers it currently reaches. See NEWSWEEK, Jan.
1, 1979, at 61.
223. It can be theorized that violence will actually increase as the major networks fight to
maintain their audiences and their advertising revenues.
224. The FCC has traditionally relied on public reaction rather than government supervision
as the most reliable test of ideas and performance in broadcasting. Office of Communications of
the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Further, the primary
responsibility for raising children remains with the parents, not the government. See White, What
Can Parents Do About Unsavory TVShows?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 19, 1978, at 83;
REPORT ON THE BROADCAST OF VIOLENT, INDECENT, AND OBSCENE MATERIALS, 51 F.C.C.2d

418, 423 (1975). See also Sex and Violence on TV, supra note 5, at 15 (statement of Harold Mendelsohn).
225. "Because the communications industries that grew up under the 1934 law went on to
flourish under the FCC's regulation, a cozy relationship was maintained for several decades between the regulatory agency and the industries it regulated." House PanelOffers Plan to Deregulate Communications, CONG. Q. WEEKLY, June 17, 1978, at 1547.
226. See, e.g., New TVSeason" Less Sex, Less Violence, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., September I1, 1978, at 32-33 (threat of public pressure leading to government involvement in programming led networks to tone down their shows); TV's New Pitch, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
September 12, 1977, at 20, 23 (violence being replaced with sex).
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content of shows that they sponsor, 227 again leading to a reduction in
the level of violence.22 8 Citizens can also organize and negotiate with
local stations, 229 and they can give their business to those that serve
their interests. Experience has shown that the networks depend on
large audiences to bring in their advertising revenues, and if the audience reaction to a particular program is loud enough, it will be
heard.2 3 o
There are, of course, problems with public activism. Some fear a

return to a McCarthy-like era in which a few impose their paranoias on
the rest,2 3I and questions exist about the propriety of sponsor censor-

ship .3 2 "Public interest" groups could well represent their own interests rather than the general public's interests. Still, the voice of public
outcry holds fewer fears than regulation by an independent government agency staffed by unelected officials.2 3 3
There is little dispute that something should be done about the
problem of television violence. Although government control could ef227. See, ag, The WarAgainstTelevision Violence, Bus. & Soc'y REV., Fall 1977, at 25, 31-34
(policy statements by various sponsors); Adler, TV- ConcernAbout Violence, Wall St. J., Mar. 18,
1977, at 8, col. 4-5 (Eastman Kodak, Colgate-Palmolive, Sears, Gillette and others have announced they wil not advertise on programs that use violence for its own sake).
228. See generally E. KAYE, supra note 148, at 114-15 (1974).
229. Community efforts in Dallas, Atlanta, Chicago and Nashville, for example, have brought
about the institution of policies "to screen advertising for demeaning references to ethnic and
racial groups, development of programing of special interest to the black community, additional
children's programs, public affairs and consumer information programs and announcements." Id.
at 138. See id. at 166-68 for an example of an agreement that was obtained. See generally ViOLENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 13; TV's New Pitch, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., September 12,
1977, at 20 (replacing violence with sex). See also THE RALEIGH TIMEs, Nov. 23, 1978, at 31-A,
col. 1-2 (PTA is teaching parents how to challenge licenses of network-owned television stations).
230. See, eg., E. KAYE, supra note 133, at 140.
231. See TVs New Pitch, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., September 12, 1977, at 23 ("Many
broadcasters, however, are worried that pressure tactics are becoming standard and could lead to
censorship or purges of TV officials and entertainers in a manner reminiscent of the Communist
hunts of the early 1950s."); Valenti, An Outlet/orArtistr in The War Against Television Violence,
Bus. & Soc'v REV., Fall 1977, at 35 ("If we allow groups of self-appointed people, no matter how
well-meaning, to become the arbiters of TV programming, how can we be certain their creative
perspective matches what is reasonable and right?").
232. "It is a very unhealthy situation when special-interest groups, stimulated by hearsay
before a program goes on the air, determine what is right and what isn't for the viewing public."
Fred Pierce, ABC President, on inability to find sponsors for "Soap," in TV's New Pitch, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., September 12, 1977, at 21; c.Eary Window, supranote 4, at 120 (sponsors
forced TV to become mediocre many years ago so the contrast in quality between the shows and
the ads wouldn't be so great). See also The ClamorAgainst Television Violence Gets Results, Bus.
WEEK, January 10, 1977, at 68-69.
233. The seven members of the FCC are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 47 U.S.C. § 154 (1976). See also Writers Guild of America, West, Inc, v. FCC,
423 F. Supp. 1064, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 1976) ("If a government body, uninsulated from the political
process, were given the power of individual ad hoc decisionmaking as to programming, the potential for abuse would be manifest.").
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fectively eliminate violence from the airwaves, it would also eliminate
much valuable communication. Deregulation is therefore to be preferred because it accommodates the need to reduce the impact of televised violence with the need to preserve first amendment rights.
Finally, even if deregulation does not solve the problem of televised
violence, public activism balances effectiveness and infringements of
the first amendment much better than government regulation and is,
therefore, the best current method of controlling the amount of violence broadcast by the networks.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The portrayal of violence on television is an effective form of communication; as such, it is entitled to first amendment protection. Moreover, because the contours of violence are so indefinite, even if some
violence is used purely for its appeal to mass audiences and not for the
purpose of conveying some message of social value, it cannot be controlled without seriously curtailing all portrayals of violence and thus
conflicting with the first amendment. Nonetheless, the portrayal of violence on television may be excessive, and it does cause significant harm
in some instances. Some action should therefore be taken to minimize
the abuses of television violence.
Of the four options currently available to deal with the problem of
television violence, deregulation, with reliance on public activism, offers the best opportunity for lessening the impact of televised violence
without violating the first amendment. Current psychological evidence
does not justify the infringement on the first amendment that would
occur with any of the other options. Evidence, both with respect to
which types of violence cause harm and with respect to whether cause
and effect relationships exist in particular cases, is too speculative to
hold the networks responsible in court, and the overall damage caused
by television violence has not been shown to be substantial enough to
justify direct government intervention in program content. Although
both judicial sanctions and direct government regulation could effectively end the problem of television violence, they would also end all
uses of violence on television. This total ban of a type of socially justified speech cannot be tolerated absent a much more substantial showing of harm from television violence.
It can be argued, nonetheless, that the FCC has the power to reduce television violence through indirect regulation, for example, by
enforcing percentage program category requirements. This remedy,
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however, ignores the underlying causes of violence on television, and it
may, therefore, simply shift violence from one time period to another.
It also entails an unacceptable infringement on freedom of expression:
the first amendment prevents independent government agencies, such
as the FCC, from deciding either which portrayals of violence can be
used for communication or at what time this communication is to be
allowed.
The option of decontrol, on the other hand, recognizes implicitly
that the former justifications for.regulation of television violence are no
longer as persuasive as they once were. Technical innovations are removing the limits on the number of available frequencies, thereby potentially offering enough diversity of programming to defuse the impact
of television violence. Just as each form of media has with time survived complaints about its adverse impact without infringements of the
first amendment, television, in expanding its spectrum, may solve its
own violence problem by providing the viewer with enough alternatives to violent programming to substantially reduce the impact of
whatever violence remains.
Even if this growing diversity does not solve the problem of television violence, however, the optimal solution is not to put aside the first
amendment and rely on government action, through the courts or
otherwise, to limit what can be shown on television. An active, free,
pluralistic society can best serve itself, not by relying on government
agencies to act in its behalf, but rather by making its needs and desires
known in a marketplace of unfettered competition. This is the conclusion inherent in the proposed Communications Act of 1978, which
would deregulate the television industry and provide such unencumbered competition. Increased competition would allow public activism,
which has shown itself to be an effective means of limiting television
violence, to become even more effective as the available program options increased. Although public activism does infringe on the first
amendment to some extent, it does so to a much lesser degree than any
of the other options. Deregulation and reliance on public activism is
the only option that properly balances the need to curtail the abuses of
television violence with the need to maintain freedom of speech.
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